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The United States Navy no longer possesses the number of
ships required to execute all its responsibilities under
existing military security agreements. Therefore, the assets
and capabilities of America's smaller naval allies could
weigh heavily in the balance determining the success or fail-
ure of an East-West confrontation. Unfortunately, the bulk of
knowledge comprising Western naval literature lacks the de-
tailed information on small navies which is necessary to
evaluate their ability to make a meaningful contribution to
NATO. Through a descriptive analysis of the Belgian Navy,
this paper attempts to show that a small navy can make a
significant contribution to the allied naval effort. In
addition, this thesis is submitted as a contribution to the
body of Western naval literature by presenting in English a
comprehensive description of the Belgian Navy heretofore
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I owe a principal debt of gratitude to the Naval Staff
of the Belgian Navy without whose assistance this thesis
would have been impossible. In particular, I wish to thank
Vice-Admiral J.P.L. Van Dyck, Chief of the Naval Staff, and
his Director of Plans and Programs who provided guidance,
research materials, and encouragement during the jie sign,
_
preparation, and writing of this study. Additionally, I
thank the countless number of personnel who spent many hours
searching for research materials and answers to the many long
lists of questions which I submitted to the Belgian Navy's
Director of Plans and Programs.
A special debt of gratitude is acknowledged to the men
and women of the Belgian Navy with whom I served during my
two years in the Belgian-US Navy Personnel Exchange Program.
Their professionalism, knowledge, and assistance was instru-
mental in allowing me to assimilate the intricacies of a
foreign language and to learn a wealth of information abou"c
Belgium, the Belgian Navy, and, especially, Mine Warfare.
Although the Belgian Navy has graciously supplied the
majority of the foreign language materials cited in this
study, the views expressed in this thesis are solely mine;
they do not reflect the official views of either the Belgian
Navy or the United States Navy. Any misconceptions or




While the Belgian Navy provides a significant contribution
to NATO , it remains virtually unknown to naval personnel and
military planners outside Belgium. The appalling lack of
information on the Belgian Navy was first impressed upon
this writer in 1975 while he was preparing to participate
in the Belgian-U.S. Navy Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). No
document existed which could provide the reader with an
overview of the Belgian Navy. The Belgian Embassy in Wash-
ington, D.C. was helpful in providing booklets and miscella-
neous data on the fleet, but it could not provide enough
information to allow the interested reader to gain an apprecia-
tion of its country's navy. Finally, the Belgian Navy itself
possessed no document for external distribution which treated
the service in a comprehensive manner. There are many
reasons for this, not the least of which is the small size of
the Belgian Navy and the concomitant relative disinterest of
major naval powers in their smaller counterparts. After all,
who cares about the Belgian Navy? Can a small navy really
contribute to the defense of NATO? Does a small nation, such
as Belgium, even need a navy? This paper attempts to answer
these and related questions by a primarily descriptive
analysis of the Belgian Navy which relies heavily on Dutch
and French language materials provided by the Belgian Ministry




Although objectivity has been attempted, the reader will
detect a very strong pro-Belgian Navy bias on the part of
the author. This is the result of experience gained while
serving with the Belgians from August 1975 to August 1977
as a member of the first Belgian-U.S . Navy Personnel Exchange
Program. The author served as the Operations Officer and the
Mine Countermeasures Officer of the Belgian Mine Warfare
Flotilla 22 and the flotilla flagship, BNS Zinnia (A-961).
After a relieving process, much the same as in the U.S. Navy,
I assumed all the duties and responsibilities of the operations
and coordination of assigned flotilla units. Since the opera-
tions officer is intimately involved in all aspects of planning
and execution of operations and missions, all sources and
classifications of documents, plans, and programs were placed
at my disposal with the exception of national cryptographic
codes and contingency war plans. Therefore, I was able to
gain an appreciation and deep respect for the capabilities of
the Belgian Navy, not only as an observer, but also as a full
participant. Furthermore, I have gained an even greater
degree of admiration for this small navy in the evolution of
this study as I drew together pieces of information from many
previously overlooked and unknown sources.
The Belgian Navy is small and limited in its capabilities.
However, even those limited capabilities, when the Navy is
integrated with other NATO forces, provide an increase in
the quantity and quality of naval forces available to the
allied naval effort. The serious decline in the number of
12

ships in the United States and British Royal Navies in-
creases the importance of small navies simply because they
represent additional forces in being. Furthermore, the
importance of small navies is further heightened when
their fleets are composed of highly sophisticated war-
ships capable of being fully integrated into the various
NATO naval commands. Finally, by virtue of their small
size, these navies are forced to cooperate with their
larger allies to build, equip, maintain, and operate
their fleets in the most cost effective manner. The
degree of cooperation required to ensure success of many
small navy programs has resulted in increased communica-
tions between allies, a greater sharing of high technology,
and a greater degree of standardization within NATO. This
is an area where the Belgian Navy has, I believe, especially
enriched allied defenses and the preparedness of NATO
European naval forces. Although the degree of cooperation
and integration falls far short of the earlier dreams
of a unified European Defense Community, the present
levels of joint operations, integrated planning, and
consultation on all aspects of naval warfare, are signifi-
cant steps in that direction.
Prior to this study, no other document, to my know-
ledge, provided a detailed description of the background,
development and status of the Belgian Navy. These details
are significant because a list of fleet units does not
provide the vital information, such as training and
13

readiness, experience levels, and the tenacity and will
to execute its missions, which is necessary to evaluate
a navy's contribution and capabilities. It is incumbent
upon the United States to possess and evaluate this infor-
mation, regardless of the size of a small mavy's fleet, and
to make this information available to its naval personnel
and other interested students of naval affairs.
The basic outline of this study is dictated by the
need to understand the background, development, and
finally, the current status of the Belgian Navy, in order
to evaluate its contribution to Belgium and to NATO. It
is presented to enable U.S. Navy Personnel, who partici-
pate in the Belgian-U.S. Navy PEP Program, an opportunity
to familarize themselves with the Belgian Navy prior to
their departure from the United States, and to assist
naval planners by providing them the comprehensive infor-
mation required to assess the Belgian Navy in the context




II. THE BELGIAN MARITIME HERITAGE
A. OVERVIEW
Belgium, unlike its Dutch neighbor to the north, was
never a great sea power. At its formation in the 1830' s,
Belgium shared many similarities with the Netherlands
to which it was roughly equivalent in size and population,
but Belgium had no ambition to become a major shipping or
naval power. Instead, a fortuitous location with abundant
quantities of water and other natural resources allowed
Belgium to become a leader in the industrial revolution.
Commercial and trade interests were, especially in the
ward of Antwerp, closely linked with the nation's former
1
ruler, the House of Orange. The provisional government
believed that any attempt to challenge the naval supremacy
of the Netherlands, let alone England and France, would
have threatened the survival of the country as an
independent state.
The fledgling Belgian nation was preoccupied with the
need to organize the complicated elements which constitute
the machinery of the state. Political leaders were over-
whelmed by the requirement to hold their delicate coali-
tion government together. All decisions concerning the
establishment of a military naval force were repeatedly
15

set aside. Besides, the treasury was exhausted and no
funds were available to make the necessary procurements
for a navy.
Although the government clearly understood the need
of a naval force to protect its merchant shipping and
coast, it did not understand the importance of a navy in
the achievement of political objectives. The Royal Belgian
Navy was not established until January 1831 when the crisis
of the closing of the Scheldt River by the Dutch required
a strong reaction from Belgium to protect its national
interests. However, the new navy was never equipped
satisfactorily to ensure a first-rate war-fighting
capability. In general, ships provided to the navy tended
to be either new vessels rejected by the merchant fleet
due to structural deficiencies or old merchant vessels no
longer fit for service, plus several cannon boats taken
from the Dutch when the Citadel of Antwerp fell on 23
December 1832. 2
The history of the Belgian Navy from 1830 to 19^6 is a
series of half-measures executed in times of impending
crisis. The actions of the government were always too
little, too late, which resulted in the nation being con-
tinually unprepared to provide adequate coastal defense
and protection to its merchant fleet. The existence of
the navy depended on the whims of the parliament despite
ardent support from the monarch who wanted to provide the
nation with a navy capable of carrying out colonial schemes
16

and providing the nation the protection it required.
Consequently, Belgium has had four separate naval forces
during the past 1^9 years, only two of which could be
rightly called a navy. Each of these naval forces is
addressed below because the impermanance of the antecedents
of the present navy has contributed to the permanance of
the Belgian Navy today.
The heritage of the Belgian Navy lies not in its
past grandeur, but rather in the ardent and persistent
efforts of its ancestors to provide a suitable naval
force to protect Belgium's coast and its commercial inter-
ests. Armed neutrality without a navy was considered to
be nothing more than naked neutrality by the proponents of
a navy. The navy's ancestors clearly recognized that
even a small navy, properly organized and equipped, would
provide significant service to the nation in peace, as
3
well as in war . **
B. THE ROYAL BELGIAN NAVY - 1831-1862
The Royal Belgian Navy represented a very modest and
difficult beginning for the naval service in Belgium. The
treasury was empty, the provisional government was pre-
occupied with itself, and the nation had no high ranking
naval officers with sufficient experience to adequately
argue the case that Belgium needed a navy to protect
itself. During the Dutch administration the Belgians had
17

been systematically excluded from navy squadrons, as well
as the Engineer and Artillery Corps of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands' fleet. In order to prevent Belgian officers
from gaining sea experience and stature, they were assigned
garrison duties in the cities. Unfortunately, the
representatives of Belgium, while serving in the Kingdom's
Congress, had not comprehended the practical utility and
benefits of a navy. Consequently, no attempt was made to
ensure complete Belgian participation in the Dutch navy.
The guiding force behind the establishment of a Belgian
navy was not even a Belgian, but rather, J. A. Gras, a
veteran French naval officer who was an engineer for the
Belgian shipyard Fleury-Duray . When Belgium declared
itself independent on k October 1830, Gras already had a
plan to seize the Citadel of Antwerp, the Netherlands'
only remaining stronghold in Belgium. It was also a
memorandum by Gras entitled, "On the Need to Establish a
Naval Force in Belgium," which finally attracted some
attention by the government and lay the foundation for the
establishment of the Royal Belgian Navy.
When the Dutch sealed off the mouth of the Scheldt
River late in I830, even the most hostile opponents of a
naval force recognized the plight of the nation's economy
and agreed that some kind of limited naval force was
necessary. The provisional government appropriated funds
to create a navy on 15 January I83I, and the Royal Belgian
Navy was Established. On 2k February approval was granted
18

to construct two brigantines armed with cannons to defend
the coast and rivers. Unfortunately, these first fleet
units were designed using defective blueprints and found
7
to be unserviceable when delivered. The navy had only
four small schooners, each armed with four cannons, which
were no match for the Dutch fleet. Proposals were made
to purchase and refit old merchant vessels which would
provide the navy with a limited war-fighting capability,
but all of these plans were overcome by the events of the
day. The newly formed navy was ill prepared to defend
itself, let alone the nation. Fortunately, England and
France intervened and forced Belgium and the Netherlands
to accept an armistice under which Belgium was recognized
as an independent state
.
The armistice signed by Belgium and the Netherlands
on 15 December I83O was broken by the Dutch in August
o
1831- Dutch fleet units sailed up the Scheldt and sunk
several Belgian merchant ships anchored off Antwerp but
were unable to destroy the tiny Belgian fleet which escaped
9to Brussels through the inland waterways. Nevertheless,
the war-fighting days of the Royal Belgian Navy were over
because France and England decided to put an end to the
hostilities between Belgium and the Netherlands. As
guarantors of Belgium's independence they feared that,
if it were allowed to continue, the fracas between the two
nations would entend over all of Europe. The French
army laid seige to the Citadel of Antwerp and forced
19

the Dutch to capitulate while a combined English and
French fleet blockaded the coast of Holland and placed an
10
embargo on Dutch shipping. Although tensions existed
between Belgium and the Netherlands until April 1839 i a
war-fighting navy was determined to be unnecessary.
Except for the continuous efforts of King Leopold I to
develop the nation's economy through increased trade and
colonial expansion, the navy would have been abolished
long before 1Q62. 11
Throughout its 31 year existence the Royal Belgian
Navy remained insignificant in size and priority. Al-
though it rendered valuable services to the nation, only
ungrateful indifference was offered to the navy. Naval
personnel manned Belgian merchant ships due to the shortage
of qualified merchant sailors, and the navy was responsible
for the training and instruction of merchant seamen. The
navy participated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
increase Belgium's foreign trade and its recognition as
an independent nation. Fisheries protection cruises
provided rescue and assistance services to the fishing
fleet throughout the North and Irish seas. The first
steamship line between New York and Antwerp was establish-
ed in 18^-0 and entrusted to the navy for operation. Like-
wise the first cross-channel shipping line was innaugurated
and maintained by naval officers and sailors. Moreover,
in 184-7 the first mailboat began operating between England
and Belgium which provided a new era of communications
20

between Europe and the British Isles. The Navy helped
the nation to compete successfully in the world economic
community, and it was indispensible in executing Leopold's
attempts to increase the prosperity of Belgium and to
12
establish a colonial empire. Despite all these successes
Leopold and his navy had little visible success in prodding
their government and nation to accept the fact that a
substantial naval power was required to stimulate the
nation's economy and protect the merchant fleet and nation.
The government was determined to rely upon its status
13
as an independent and perpetually neutral state . -*
In spite of the above-mentioned services to the na-
tion, the existence of the navy was constantly challenged.
In 1844 an impassioned Father Foere declared that there
were three reasons Belgium did not need a naval fleet.
First, the nation was a neutral country protected by the
might and power of several major naval powers. Second,
Belgium had no colonies to protect and therefore required
no navy. Finally, the extermination of piracy was being
executed by the principal European powers with the most
efficient means and measures available. Belgium could not
hope to obtain the skills and ships necessary to protect
its merchant shipping. The nation could rely upon the
good services of its allies to assist Belgian ships in





The revolutions of 1848 triggered a war scare in
Europe and resulted in further reductions in the support
and budgets to the navy. In order to show the nation
that fiscal and political responsibility was a serious
goal of the government, it tightened purse strings and
refused to approve urgent proposals for new navy ships
to replace decommissioned vessels. Between 1853 and 1862
the parliament repeatedly debated the need for a navy.
The representatives decided to allow the navy to starve
1 ^itself out. J Finally, in 1862, the government abolished
the Royal Belgian Navy over the strong objections of the
King and many loyal naval supporters. Naval personnel
either found employment in the merchant marine or returned
16
to their former occupations.
Despite this turn of events, there existed in parlia-
ment a sizeable group of supporters for a navy. Period-
ically debates were held, and the dream of a navy remained
alive. To ensure some naval expertise in the military,
all able artillery officers were sent to the French navy
17for training. ' Nonetheless, Belgium possessed no cap-
ability to defend its coast and harbors.
Little more than a year after the abolition of the
navy, the Scheldt River was declared open for free transit
by all nations. In the absence of a navy Belgium was
forced to rely upon its merchant marine and the army to
ensure good order and safety within its territorial waters
and rivers. By the turn of the century several armed
22

police boats were required to patrol the Scheldt River
mouth, and it was with four similar boats that Belgium
became involved in World War One. As will be seen, Belgium
was not much better equipped in 19^0. In both cases the
nation was ill prepared to protect its neutrality, let
alone to participate in a major war.
C. THE CORPS OF SEAMEN AND TORPEDO BOATS - 1917-1926
In 1865, shortly after the death of the Royal Belgian
Navy, Leopold II ascended to the throne. The 30 year-old
monarch had travelled throughout the world. He had bold
visions of establishing an empire which would greatly
expand his small nation's economy and international
18
status. Leopold fully understood the importance of
seapower to fulfill his dream. This is clearly illustrated
in his statement that, "(n)o nation which touches the sea
19is small." He desperately wanted to establish his
people on a maritime footing with a navy equal to his
dreams. Although guided by the most enlightened minds of
his times, such as Banning and Brialmont, Leopold was
unable to find acceptance of his ideas. Nevertheless, he
established the practice of sending army officers to
train with the French navy to ensure some degree of naval
20
expertise for his nation.
Unfortunately for Leopold and his naval supporters, the
war scare created by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870
23

quickly subsided, leaving parliament more convinced than
ever that their armed, perpetual neutrality could be
safely guaranteed by the 1839 treaty without the addtional
21
expense of a navy.
Shortly thereafter the government was embarassed by
not being able to carry out its responsibilities of
patrolling the North Sea under the recently signed Hague
Convention of 1882. The government, forced to rent mer-
chant ships, eventually built the three masted bark
"Stad Oostende" to carry out fisheries protection missions
In the meantime it recognized that the merchant fleet had
fallen into a seriously deteriorated state due to the
lack of experienced personnel. Formerly, the merchant
fleet had been manned by recruits who had learned their
trade while serving in the Royal Belgian Navy. The decay
of the merchant fleet was viewed with alarm, producing
many proposals to provide a corps of qualified personnel.
All of these proposals ended in poorly administered pro-
22grams which did little to alleviate the problem. Even
with Leopold's great successes in Africa, which greatly
increased Belgium's prosperity and stature, he was unable
to convince the parliament that Belgium required a navy to
protect his valuable Congo colony.
As war clouds gathered over Europe Leopold struggled
with his recalcitrant parliament to gird the nation for
the possibility of war. Although unsuccessful in gaining




approval for modernization and reform of the army. -* Albert
I succeded to the throne in 1909 and was instrumental in
establishing general military service one year ahead of
2kthe outbreak of the First World War.
When the war began, the government attempted to organize
a small naval force to defend its coast and rivers but
events progressed with such speed that time was not
available to improvise. The nation's small gun boats
were forced to flee to the Netherlands where they were
interned by the neutral Dutch and lay at anchor until
2=!
the armistice. J
The only naval engagements involving Belgian forces
took place in the Congo where several small boats battled
superior German naval units on Lake Tanganyika and Lake
Kivu. Although the meritorious and courageous efforts
of this small "Colonial Military Navy" cannot be denied,
the successes of this combined Belgian-French force had
little impact upon the course of the war in Europe.
Since the Belgians had no means of maritime defense
in 191^i it was only with the help of the French Navy that
Belgium participated in the allied maritime defense effort.
More than ^-00 Belgians served on board French naval ships
during the last two years of World War One. Many of these
sailors served on minesweepers where they acquired valuable
experience which formed the basis of the Belgian Navy's
subsequent expertise in mine warfare. '
25

A personnel depot was created in 1917 "to train crews
for the supply ships of the army and to protect the
28
coast. After 1918 Belgian seamen had over 50 ships
at their disposal including 11 torpedo boats and 26 mine-
sweepers which had been abandoned by the retreating
29Germans. A study commission, created by the General
Staff to determine the usefulness and disposition of this
small fleet, was favorably disposed to the re-establish-
ment of the navy. v In spite of similar enthusiam by the
press and the public, the parliament gave a cool reception
to the commission's recommendation. Instead, several
interministerial commissions argued over the costs of
coastal defense and the maintenance of a naval force
suitable to that task. Parliament decided against creat-
ing a navy but authorized a Corps of Seamen and Torpedo
31Boats to replace the personnel depot.
Unfortunately this naval corps was treated as a step-
child of the army and never received the political and
economic support necessary for its survival. In addition,
the tide of public opinion had shifted from the euphoria
of victory to the reality that the world had undergone a
fundamental change. Men no longer flocked to join the
military service and the nation faced an imminent shortage
32
of merchant seamen needed to ensure economic recovery.
The question of maintaining a naval force was again re-
viewed by a 27-member military commission composed of
26

supporters and opponents of a navy. After lengthy debates
the commission voted 2^ to 2 in favor of maintaining the
small naval corps, with one member abstaining. Neverthe-
less, parliament decided that the military capabilities of
the Corps of Seamen and Torpedo Boats were not worth the
maintenance expenditures. The parliament further declared
that since an adequate coastal defense force was beyond
the limited means of the nation, Belgium would rely upon
its neutrality, allies, and, to a much more limited extent,
membership in the League of Nations for its security. y
Consequently, the Corps of Seamen and Torpedo Boats was
abolished on 9 July 1926. The nation was once again
without a coastal defense force while the many ships of
its former flotilla rusted at their moorings.
In order to train officers and sailors for the mer-
chant fleet and mailboats, the government continued to
operate the Zinnia , a former British Royal Navy destroyer
. . .35
escort, under the civilian merchant marine administration. ^
Zinna, purchased in 1920 as a school ship and fisheries
protection vessel, served Belgium until captured by the
Germans in 19^0. The vessel was completely rebuilt, re-
christened the Barbara, and sailed under the flag of the
German Navy until it was recaptured by the British in
19^-5- The Barbara was then given to the Royal Navy
l6Section Beige, the precursor of today's Belgian Navy.
27

D. THE ROYAL NAVY SECTION BELGE - 19^1-19^5
As early as 1931 "the disbandment of the Corps of
Seamen and Torpedo Boats appeared to have been a mistake.
Senior defense leaders, including the Director of the
Mobilization Service, urged the military to seek a solution
for the defense of the harbors, waterways and coast of
the nation. The General Staff and Maritime Affairs Adminis-
tration conducted an inventory of all available vessels
which could be pressed into service to defend the nation.
It was determined that approximately 30 more vessels
would be required to provide a modicum of security. Al-
though planning for coastal defense was undertaken
seriously by 193^. it was not until December 1938 that a
37
naval personnel depot was established. -" In the event of
mobilization personnel from the army and civilian naval
organizations would comprise the coastal defense force.
Concurrently the government became conscious that if
its neutrality policy was to be successful, a limited
coastal defense was indispensible for watching over the
coast and protecting Belgian merchant ships. Plans were
made to order additional patrol boats with credits spread
over the years 19^0-19^-2. In the event, it was already
too late and this was too little. Neither Belgium nor
its allies were prepared for the maelstrom which engulfed
them in 19^0. Belgium's small coastal defense force
never received the numbers of personnel required nor the
28

kinds of equipment necessary to participate in the era of
modern warfare. Sailors had "been issued Mauser rifles from
1889 which had been refurbished in 1916 to take bayonets.
The old World War One torpedo boats and wooden fishing
vessels pressed into service were no match for the newer
equipment and tactics of the enemy.
Despite the many heroic rescue and minesweeping efforts
of the three coastal defense squadrons at Antwerp,
Zeebrugge and Ostend prior to 10 May 19^0, this small
improvised fleet was unable to counter the modern magnetic
mines laid by the enemy after that date. Assistance from
allies was minimal due to the demands of protecting their
own nations. After 10 May 19^0 the remaining intact
harbors of Belgium were rapidly blockaded and the small
Belgian fleet served primarily to assist in evacuation of
the wounded and refugees. By 19 May 19^0 bombing and
strafing attacks on the Belgian coast were so intense that
the cities had to be evacuated. The small vessels of the
coastal defense force steamed along the coast in an effort
to draw fire away from the evacuation craft. Finally, on
21 May the funds of the national bank were transferred to
England along with some of the last refugees who were
able to escape the country. The small naval force
continued its rescue operations along the French coast
Llq
until the allied evacuation of Dunkirk on 28 May 19^0.
During the evacuation of Dunkirk several Belgian patrol
boats distingusihed themselves while attached to the Fifth
29

Division of the French Navy. Afterwards, the remaining
units of the coastal defense force sailed to Spain where
they were interned and literally fell apart due to the
lack of maintenance and old age.
Meanwhile, countless Belgians carried on the war effort
in England, among them over 1500 men who eventually served
in the British Royal Navy. The most prominent Belgian
in the Royal Navy and true hero of the Belgian Navy was
Victor Billet who had served on the Zinnia and was an
officer on one of the Dover-Costende mailboats. ' The
mailboats had been blockaded in Southampton and many men
desired to serve their nation instead of sitting out the
war in the relative safety of the English countryside.
Victor Billet not only wanted to serve Belgium and regain
his nation's liberty, but also had a dream of seeing
the establishment of a permanent Belgian Navy in his
lib
lifetime. By July 19^0 Billet had decided that an
all-Belgian section in the Royal Navy would raise morale
in his beleaguered country, substantially assist the allies
in their maritime defense efforts, and effectively use the
more than 1200 Belgian fishermen and 280 trawlers which
had fled to England. J
Although Billet's initial attempts to gain acceptance
of his ideas met with little more than sympathetic
understanding, he received significant support from the
Belgian Minister of Economic Affairs in London, and
eventually from the Royal Navy. On 10 October 19^0
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Victor Billet was commissioned as a lieutenant in the
Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) and ordered to take
command of about 30 Belgian fishermen and sailors who had
"been recruited by the Belgian Maritime Affairs Administra-
tion in England. This Belgian section received basic
training at HMS Royal Arthur, a Royal Navy training camp
at Skegness, where all of the Belgian volunteers received
their initial training throughout the war. The first
contingent of Belgian sailors completed their training
on 6 December 19^0 and were assigned to the HMS Lochinvar,
the Royal Navy's Mine Warfare School.
Meanwhile, additional contingents of Belgian sailors
were serving in ships of the Royal Navy throughout the
fleet. Volunteers from the old coastal defense force
and the merchant marine were joined by the cadets of the
Belgian school ship Mercator who joined the Royal Navy
kg
en masse . The enthusiasm with which the Belgian volun-
teers learned new skills and assimilated the Royal Navy's
fighting spirit soon earned them the respect and admira-
tion of their British counterparts. This no doubt
played an important part in the decision of the British
Government to approve the creation of a special department
within the Royal Navy which provided Belgian sailors an
opportunity to fight as a national naval force. On 3
April 19^1 a unique chapter was written in the annals of
the Royal Navy when the Admiralty officially established
the Royal Navy Section Beige. The dream of Lt. Billet
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had been partially fulfilled. The Royal Navy Section
Beige (RNSB) would play a significant role in the war
at sea and would become the precursor of a permanent
52Belgian Navy.
The Belgian Government in exile nominated Commandant
Georges Timmermans as the senior officer of the RNSB. He
had served as captain of cross-channel mailboats, was a
member of the Belgian maritime forces, and had distinguish-
ed himself at Dunkirk and subsequent evacuations on the
French coast. J When the Belgian Navy was finally
established in 19^6 Timmermans served as the navy's first
commodore
.
On all ships manned by members of the Royal Navy
Section Beige the flags of both England and Belgium were
54proudly flown. In the beginning of 19^2 two corvettes
were manned by Belgians, first the Godetia (K-226) , then
the Buttercup (K-193) • Both of these ships conducted
three years of almost unbroken convoy escort operations.
By the end of the war the British Admiralty increased the
number of ships entrusted to the RNSB. These ships were
manned exclusively by Belgians and included the afore-
mentioned corvettes, two patrol boats, and a small
squadron of Motor Minesweepers (MMS) which were part of
the Royal Navy Flotilla 118. 5 °
Despite the existence of the RNSB, Belgian officers
and sailors were too numerous for the small number of
vessels available for this navy in exile. Therefore
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Belgians were assigned to ships on a fleet-wide basis
and participated in most of the major campaigns and
battles fought by the Royal Navy in the Second World War.
These loyal and courageous patriots participated in all
major British naval operations from the North Atlantic to
the Caribbean, and from the Mediterranean and Red Sea to
the Indian Ocean. They operated along the coasts of France,
Belgium, England, and the Netherlands, and helped open
the way for the liberation of their beloved country. '
During the liberation of Belgium six RNSB minesweepers
sailed to Ostend and swept a route to Zeebrugge, Walchern
and Antwerp under enemy gunfire. The units were greeted
with unbridled enthusiasm in Belgium, where the RNSB
recruited over 1200 volunteers. Eventually, the entire
Belgian Section was sent back to Belgium to assist in
re-establishing the government in the liberated country.
On 8 November 19^5 the Royal Navy Section Beige was
officially abolished, but the urgent requirements to
clear the sea routes of wrecks and mines ensured the
survival of the Belgian Section and aided in forcing the
creation of a permanent Belgian Navy.
Furthermore, the International Organization for the
Clearance of Mines in European Waters had defined national
legal responsibilities for the safeguarding of sea routes.
On 20 July 19^-5 Belgium received a sector which extended
from the French border to Walchern in the Netherlands.
Under the terms of the convention, signatories were required
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to remove all dangers to navigation within their assigned
sectors. The government conferred with the British to
determine the cost of removal operations if performed by
the Royal Navy. Although Belgium possessed highly trained
and experienced personnel, the nation had no minesweepers
to do the work. Fortunately, for the RNSB and all support-
ers of a navy, it was determined that the least costly
and most logical solution was the creation of a permanent
59Belgian Navy.
E. THE BELGIAN NAVY
The creation of a permanent navy on 1 February 19^6 re-
presented the fulfillment of a long cherished dream and
a turning point in Belgian history. The major determinant
in forcing the re-establishment of a navy appears to have
been the requirements of the international sea routes
convention of 19^5 • Nonetheless, the dreams of such men
as Leopold I, Leopold II, Lt . Billet and Commodore
Timmermans had been realized. The importance of a naval
force in Belgium was finally recognized as indispensible
in executing the nation's responsibilities in domestic
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and international affairs. The Second World War
convinced the Belgian Government and the nation that a
naval force could not be improvised due to the complexity
of modern warfare and increased sophistication of warships
The nation had been caught poorly prepared for two world
3^

wars, and Belgium could not afford to let that happen
again. The only answer was to maintain sufficient military
forces to adequately perform the peacetime and wartime
functions of a coastal nation. Naturally, the expense of
such forces could not be unlimited, but rather a delicate
balance had to be struck in light of the nation's economic,
political, and social circumstances and in combination
with some form of collective security undertaken with
Belgium's allies.
When World War Two ended, Belgium had little time
or reason to celebrate the victory. The events of May
19^-0 came rushing back into the conscience of the country.
The entire fabric of Belgian society was altered, many
of its institutions radically changed, and the linguistic
disputes increased, creating an internal conflict
which lasts to this day. All of these forces, combined
with charges and counter-charges of collaboration during
the war, came together in the Belgian royal question
which by 1950 came to dominate all the energies of the
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country. Not even the new navy was immune from the
conflict as evidenced by its designation as the Zeemacht -
Force Naval
e
. Although the classical name, Royal Belgian
Navy, was preferred by its supporters, it was recognized as
early as 7 September 19^5 that the king's refusal to go
into exile with his government during the war
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and emotion surrounding the resulting royal question
forced the supression of that name. Therefore the navy
was simply designated as the sea power of the state
.
The development of a modern navy in Belgium thus had
a modest beginning, and it has never been recognized as
a full partner of the army whose existence could be traced
back in an unbroken line to the romanticized War of
Liberation of I830. Moreover, the government had also
decided to establish an air force which substantially
reduced the funding available to the new navy. Neverthe-
less by July 19^6 the navy was preoccupied with the
establishment of its organizational structure and clearing
the Belgian coast and harbors of mines and wrecks. The
navy, with 77 officers and 1600 enlisted personnel,
possessed a small fleet of ships which included two fish-
eries protection vessels, one British buoylayer, two
patrol boats, several auxilliaries , and a squadron of nine
minesweepers which were on loan from the Royal Navy
Flotilla 118.
Between 19^6 and 19^9 the navy rapidly carried out
and completed all of the requirements of the international
agreement concerning sea routes. The MMS-type minesweepers
which comprised the Belgian Navy Minesweeper Squadron 118
conducted extensive sweeping operations in all of the
coastal, approach, and entrance channels to Belgium and
the Scheldt River. The Belgian sector was cleared of all
mines, wrecks, and obstructions which threatened maritime
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traffic. Aids to navigation were re-established in all
shipping lanes with the laying of new buoys in addition
to refurbishing fixed coastal structures such as light-
houses and navigational ranges. New personnel were educated
and trained in the Netherlands under an agreement with
the Royal Netherlands Navy. The navy rapidly increased
the level of its expertise in mine warfare, diving, and
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) brought to it by the mem-
bers of the Royal Navy Section Beige, the coastal defense
force, and World War One veterans who had served with the
French Navy. ^
In March 19^9, the navy was finally recognized as a
branch of the Belgian Armed Forces when it was transferred
from the Ministry of Communications to the Ministry of
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Defense. This was undoubtedly a result of the negotia-
tions being conducted to form the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization which would require each nation to shoulder
the responsibility of its own sea approaches and entrance
channels to harbors and to participate equitably in the
common defense of Western Europe. On k April 19^9 Belgium
signed the North Atlantic Treat, which virtually assured
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the survival of the navy.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided the
stimulus necessary to allow the navy to expand. The
first naval training center at Brugge was established with
naval instructors from the Belgian, French, and Royal
Netherlands Navies. A troopship, the Kamina, was
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commissioned and used to carry Belgian volunteers to
Korea. Under the. American Military Defense Assistance
Program (MDAP) Belgium "built up a large mine countermeasures
/TO
fleet which possessed the most modern equipment available.
The fifties turned out to be very active years for the
Belgian Navy. The requirements of NATO membership, the
Korean War, and growing unrest in the Belgian Congo combined
to stretch the navy to its limit, but greatly expanded the
experience and training levels of its personnel. Several
naval bases were maintained in the Lower Congo which were
eventually brought together under the Maritime Command of
the Lower Congo in 1953- This small naval command of eight
ships and three bases provided maritime direction and
coordination in an area over seventy times that of Belgium.
After the independence of the Congo in I960, Belgian ships
patrolled the streams and coast and assisted in the
evacuation of many Belgian nationals. By the end of I960
the Congo naval command was abolished and Belgium closed
its last naval base there in 1961. The age of empire had
ended for Belgium and a new era of economic cooperation
with the Congo had begun. The small Congo fleet returned
home, and the navy began a new era of increased participa-
69tion in NATO activities which continues to this day.
During the fifties the navy also worked tirelessly
to ensure that it was capable of executing its major
peacetime and wartime missions. The results, although not
always spectacular, provided Belgium with a significant
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naval capability. The navy was able to ensure the safety
of its waters from the mine threat, and it mounted a limited
anti-submarine defense. Throughout its short history the
Belgian Navy has stressed Anti -Submarine Warfare (ASW)
and Mine Countemeasures (MCM) as its primary warfare
objectives. The navy has attempted to emphasize those
missions which could be accomplished within the limits
of the assets provided by the government. Today the Belgian-
Navy remains dedicated to the same naval warfare objectives
and is a leader in the area of mine warfare. In many
respects the Belgian Navy has now advanced into its
second generation. The first was characterized by a
predominant mine warfare orientation, while the second
generation is oriented more equally to anti-submarine
70
warfare and mine warfare
.
In contrast to the early years of the Royal Belgian
Navy or the Corps of Seamen and Torpedo Boats, today's
Belgian Navy is much more powerful and in no way
comparable to its ancestors. However, the navy of today
possesses that same determination to protect the nation
and its merchant fleet and proudly to show the flag of
Belgium. The navy is still small and must fight for its
share in the national defense of Belgium, but it is





III. NAVAL MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
Belgium is situated south of the Rhine-Meuse Delta,
occupying most of the Scheldt Basin, although the mouth of
the river is in Holland; and the middle Meuse Basin is
inside its borders. Belgium is a buffer state, lying
at the western end of the Germanic world, and to the
south in contract with the Latin civilization of France.
It has been an age-long area of conflict between the two
cultures, and its numerous battlefields have earned for it
the title of the "Cockpit of Europe." 71
No point in Western Europe is mere than 400 miles from
the sea, a factor of great significance where climate and
transport are concerned. Belgium occupies the central
position on the coast of the North Sea and is appropriately
72
referred to as the strategic cross-roads of Europe.
The Belgian coast (or Maritime Flanders) consists of a
broad sandy beach backed by a line of dunes which have
been strengthened against the sea. The coast is straight
and unbroken throughout its length of just under 42 miles,
except for the canal exits at Nieuwpoort, Ostend, and
Zeebrugge, (See MAP 1, p. 109).
Sea communications play a dominant role in the affairs
of Belgium's economy and defense. Since the nation is
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located in the delta area of the three great rivers of
Europe, the Scheldt, Meuse , and Rhine, Belgium has built
extensive canal systems covering more than 1,270 miles of
navigable waterways, of which 950 miles are regularly
used. All navigable canals are interconnected and provide
access to each of these rivers. Including the Ship and
Albert Canals, a total of about 200 miles of the rivers
can accommodate vessels up to 2,000 tons, another 125
miles can handle 1,350 ton vessels; and nearly 225 more
miles can take vessels up to 600 tons. The remainder can
take 300 ton barges, mostly self-propelled, the minimum
official standard of navigability. The canals from Gent
to Terneuzen and from Brugge to Zeebrugge are termed Ship
Canals and, in effect, make seaports out of their inland
terminals. Minimum draft enroute to Gent is 29 feet; to
Brugge it is 26 feet. The canal linking Brussels with
the Rupel and Scheldt Rivers, and thus with Antwerp, has
a minimum width of 82 feet and a minimum depth of 19
feet. 73
The Albert Canal across the Kempenland connecting the
Scheldt at Antwerp and the Meuse north of Liege is also
a high capacity waterway. It is 335 feet wide, 18 feet
deep, and its locks were recently widened to 78 feet by
656 feet. In conjunction with these canals, Belgium has
the densest railway system in the world with over 2,590
miles of roadbed and 7.375 miles of track. Thus trans-
portation through Belgium provides the primary avenue of
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access to the sea for many European nations. Quite
significantly, despite the size and efficiency of the
railway network, waterborne transport of cargo remains the
primary mode and usually the most cost effective.
Although the Belgian coast is extremely small in
comparison with that of most maritime nations, it is
situated at the most important point of the North Sea,
only fifty miles from the United Kingdom, and in the area
of greatest population density in the world. The Belgian
coast is one of the most heavily travelled sea routes
any where with over 300 ships per day of greater than
1,000 tons transiting close before the coast.
Two of the world's three busiest ports are Rotterdam-
Europort and Antwerp, numbers one and three respectively.
Although Antwerp lies 50 miles up the Scheldt River, it has
achieved its stature due to its waterway connections to
the interior and the importance of Belgium as a commercial
and industrial nation. Antwerp, with its 25 docks and
over 30 miles of quays, handles an average of 175 major
cargo ships per day. ^
The Belgian economy is heavily dependent upon exports
and leads all other nations in the per capita value of
foreign trade. The small domestic market makes the export
of manufactured goods imperative as the country has no
natural resources other than its agricultural produce,
minerals for building materials and glass production, and
coal deposits which are difficult to exploit and inadequate
to

for domestic needs. Thus, almost all the raw materials
used in manufacturing and much of the fuel needed by
industry must be imported. In order to pay for her imports
Belgium must export approximately 50 percent of her total
production. Although percentages are difficult to calculate,
between i960 and 1971 maritime trade transport tonnage
more than doubled while the value more than tripled.'
Maritime traffic remains a fundamental element of the
industrial society. It also constitutes the most vulner-
able part and the easiest element by which to neutralize
a nation's economic system. A recent Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study
indicates that at least 25% of the EEC's, 60% of the
United Kingdom's, and 58% of France's exports travels in
ocean going shipping, and that does not include barge,
river, cross -Channel, and cross-North Sea traffic.
Furthermore, Europe imports, by sea, more than 56$ of its
total energy needs. Moreover, the OECD study indicates
that the shipping demand for all categories of cargo
77
continues to grow at a substantial rate.
Belgium's growing dependence upon its maritime trade




The Belgian Merchant Fleet 7
Year Ships GRT Year Ships GRT
1910 - 159 295,913 1950 - 222 481,207
1920 - 208 410,423 I960 - 206 728,981
1930 - 238 546,002 1970 - 230 1,062,152
1939 - 200 408,418 1977 - 271 1,595,489
Additionally, it is quite significant that although ships
are not replaced one for one as old vessels are retired,
the aggregate tonnage has increased. This is because new
ships tend to be larger, more costly, and from a defense
position, more vulnerable. It is also significant to
note that half of Belgium's merchant fleet is less than
five years old, and another 257^ less than 10 years old,
indicating a fairly recent trend toward increasing and
improving the country's small but highly capable merchant
service
.
Alain Enthoven, while reviewing the defense forces
of Western Europe posed the question, "(w)hat military-
economic sense is there in countries with small forces
maintaining some of each kind of force - for the Belgians
79
to have a 4,200 man navy...?' One must immediately
point out that Belgium is a sovereign, independent state
with national goals and objectives, and it cannot abdicate
its national interest, nor can it depend upon its neighbors
to execute maritime control responsibilities on its behalf.
Whether or not a small Belgian Navy makes economic or mili-
tary sense isan academic question, as in reality, Belgium
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not only needs a navy, but it also needs to enlarge that
navy to successfully carry out the missions which are
dictated by its political, economic, and geographic position
Additionally, Belgium, as a maritime nation, might well
consider doubling the size of the navy at the expense of
its other services since the missions of the navy are cost
effective when viewed in the light of services rendered
to the nation and benefits gained during peacetime.
B. BELGIAN DEFENSE POLICY
The Defense Policy of Belgium is not well known since
it is hardly ever a subject of debate, as the defense
policies of the larger nations of the Atlantic Alliance.
Furthermore, it is normally assumed, with considerable
validity, that small nations are unable to execute independ-
ent defense policies and must therefore pass the policy
initiative to their larger allies. This does not imply
an abdication of responsibility for national defense, but
rather a realization that a small nation can no longer
assert that it is in such a position to insure its own
defense. However, at the same time Belgium must insure
that its vital national interests are safeguarded.
Consequently, collective security has become the touchstone
of Belgian defense policy. This is especially true as
Belgium's economic and geographic situations have caused
a convergence of national interests with Belgium's
^5

neighbors and a recognition of a basic underlying dependence
of the states of Western Europe, and especially of Belgium's
dependence on its surrounding countries. With them it
shares the primary aim or objective of national defense:
80
the maintenance of peace, both regional and worldwide.
Deterrence through alliance has become the byword of
Belgium's defense policy. The constraints upon Belgium's
contribution to the alliance spring from inevitable economic,
financial, and demographic limits. A concerted effort has
been made to insure the stability of Belgium's contribu-
tion to the alliance at levels consistent with the re-
quests of its allies while avoiding undue burden on the
nation, and the fluctuations springing from domestic
politics. Public opinion has seldom had a great impact
on Belgian policies with NATO. The sizeable official
public information effort has assisted in reducing
opposition to Belgian support of the alliance, but has
scarcely generated great enthusiasm for increased partici-
pation. Should the individual citizen see benefits in new
civil programs, at the expense of military expenditures,
81then this situation could change.
C. NATO COMMITMENTS
In general, Belgium strives to enhance detente and
international stability by fully participating in NATO.
Belgian military forces are totally integrated with NATO
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throughout the alliance area in order to increase efficiency
of operations, tactics, strategy, and overall cooperation.
Belgium and her Benelux neighbors are among the most
faithful supporters of NATO due to a realistic appraisal
of their military capabilities and their security needs.
As small nations they have suffered the trials of two
major wars with their death, destruction and dislocation,
in part because they stood against the aggressor individual-
ly rather than as members of an international force.
Thus, Belgium has pledged herself, under Article 5 of
the NATO Treaty, to fight beside her allies if any one of
them is attacked. This certainty of response is one of
Belgium's primary means of enhancing deterrence. A second
means of enhancing deterrence has been Belgium's designa-
tion of her entire armed forces - army, navy, and air
force, - to NATO integrated commands when requested. This
reflects Belgium's desire that each nation deliver to the
alliance troops and support to create a more efficient
European military organization and thereby strengthen the
Op
overall alliance.
The Belgian Navy is integrated into the NATO allied
structure through the organization of the Commander-in-
Chief Channel (CINCHAN) , a permanent allied command
responsible for the protection of the entire English
Channel area. Reporting directly to CINCHAN is the sub-
area commander, Commander Belgium-Netherlands Channel Sub-
Area (COMBENECHAN) who is the Admiral Netherlands Home
^7

Fleet. COMBENECHAN exercises operational control over the
forces assigned to him to conduct maritime operations in
the BENECHAN Sub-Area which comprises a large portion of
the southern part of the North Sea. The fully integrated
Belgium-Netherlands staff of COMBENECHAN is headquartered
in Den Helder, Netherlands. The Commander Naval Operations,
Belgian Navy, COMOPSNAV, serves as the Chief of Staff to
COMBENECHAN when that organization is activated by CINCHAN.
It is significant to note that all units of the Belgian
Navy are earmarked for assignment to the defense of Allied
Command Channel (ACCHAN) under CINCHAN, however, the
majority of naval vessels would be directly assigned to
COMBENECHAN to conduct MCM operations along the approach,
coastal, and entrance channels to Belgian and Netherlands'
ports.
The Admiral Netherlands Home Fleet (COMBENECHAN) is
also the Admiral BENELUX (ABNL) who is the Coastal Commander
for Belgium and the Netherlands when the BENELUX defense
organization is activated. This coastal command was
organized to execute national tasks in coastal and contig-
uous waters of Belgium and the Netherlands in a well or-
ganized and coordinated manner to ensure the proper
distribution of forces for maximum effectiveness of
available assets of the two nations. Figure 1 shows the
relationship between the NATO and BENELUX commands.
Belgium's NATO naval mission is the protection of sea
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southern part of the North Sea. The shallow coastal and
entrance channels to Belgian harbors are excellent for the
execution of mine warfare, and the approach routes to the
English Channel and certain parts of the North Sea are
extremely vulnerable to submarine attacks. Thus, three
major types of operations are required to carry out this
mission successfully - anti-submarine warfare, mine counter-
measures, and defense of the coastal and continguous
waters. The NATO and national aspects of these tasks
converge and overlap with respect to coastal and entrance
channels to Belgian ports and eventually to those of her
aliianc e partne rs
.
Belgian defense of merchant vessels against submarine
attacks is to be handled by new frigates which were
expressly designed for NATO participation and the accomplish-
ment of national missions. The new frigates are well suited
for the detection and destruction of hostile submarines and
escort duty in the English Channel, North Sea, and Eastern
Atlantic . The Belgian Navy plans to assign one frigate to
the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFO RIANT) on a
rotational basis beginning in 1980. ^ They will also
be available for national missions such as coastal surveil-
lance and interdiction, training, and contingency operations.
Mine countermeasures have played a significant role
in world wars and are the concern of most of the NATO
member-nations. The NATO Standing Naval Forces Channel
( STANAVFO RCHAN) is an allied MCM squadron tasked with the
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protection of the English Channel and the North Sea. The
squadron is normally composed of from seven to nine MCM-
type vessels whose peacetime task is to exercise constantly
in NATO and national MCM exercises. Although all NATO
countries are welcome to participate, STANAVFORCHAN
usually consists of minehunters from Great Britain, mine-
sweepers from West Germany and the- Netherlands, and one
unit from Belgium which she alternates between minehunters
and minesweepers. Each ship must "be assigned for a
minimum of six months, however, most nations provide
units for an entire year. Units assigned to STANAVFORCHAN
are formally "chopped" from national controlling authorities
and rely upon their national organizations only for admin-
istrative and supply support. The command of the squadron
is rotated between all nations except West Germany and
Denmark, the former for political reasons and the latter
since Denmark does not participate on a permanent basis.
The training, cooperation and coordination of the
forces of STANAVFORCHAN has achieved truly outstanding
levels of combat readiness. The twelve months together
provide each navy with a better understanding of its allies,
an appreciably enhanced professionalism in MCM, tactics,
allied procedures, and especially a high degree of pro-
ficiency with allied communications, radio-telephone
procedures and the allied signal publications. Additional-
ly, since STANAVFORCHAN has no permanent homeport, many
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excellent harbors are visited throughout the northern
European area which provides this NATO squadron an ex-




Although it is often difficult to evaluate the rela-
tive importance of one mission versus another, the follow-
ing primary and secondary mission areas of the Eelgian
Navy have been identified and prioritized in descending
order by this writer:
1. Primary Mission Areas
a. Protection of Belgium's Sea Lines of
Communication and Assistance to the
Merchant Fleet
b. Coastal Security and Sanitation of Vital
Sealanes
c. Coastal Surveillance and Interdiction
d. Fisheries Protection and Control
e. River Surveillance and Control
2. Secondary Mission Areas
a. Search and Rescue





e. Oceanographic Research and Data Collection
f Show the Flag and Goodwill Cruises
1 . Primary Mission Areas
a. Protection of Belgium's Sea Lines of Communica-
tion and Assistance to the Merchant Fleet
The missions of the Belgian Navy are, to a
greater or lesser degree, similar to most other nations'
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navies, though scant thought is given to using naval force
to achieve political ends. This does not, however, imply
that some national political ends cannot be realized by
the Belgian Navy, but rather it points to the fact that
only large navies can successfully accomplish the offen-
sive sides of many of these missions. In true Mahanian
style, the Belgians perceive the- sea as a 'giant highway'
or 'wide common' which provides nations having access to
it with a means of transport that is easier and cheaper
than any which exists across land. D Like Britain during
the period discussed by Mahan, Belgium's primary aim is
to protect her commerce, to ensure that the trade routes
across the seas remain available. Due to the size and
composition of the Belgian Navy it is not able to accomplish
this mission without allied assistance. Nevertheless,
Belgium is ready to participate in protecting her sea
lines of communication and merchant fleet within the
constraints of her economy and demography. The four new
frigates will again provide her with a semblance of the
type of naval platforms necessary to adequately conduct
ASW and escort operations. However, "four frigates doth
not a naval power make" and Belgium must continue to rely
upon her allies to protect her interests, both in the
waters contiguous to Belgium and around the world. The
offensive side of this mission - sea denial - has been
passed on to her more capable allies, but she is preparing
to participate even in the sea denial role as part of the
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Standing Naval Forces Atlantic in 1980. In simplistic
terms the defensive side of protecting Belgium's SLOCs may
be thought of as sea control, in that the object is to
temporarily maintain control over a limited area in order
to protect the merchant fleet of the nation and other
nations' vessels enroute to or departing from Belgian
86
ports. Caution must be used in this terminology as
sea control and sea denial are not necessarily opposites.
Preventing the enemy from using the sea is implicit in the
idea of sea control while they share many similar tactical
objectives
.
The purely defensive side of this mission area
consists of the physical protection of the merchant
vessels be it from air, surface, or sub-surface attacks.
Included herein are mine countermeasures to ensure that
vital approaches, coastal routes, and entrance channels
are kept free of sea mines which pose an especially
dangerous threat to maritime traffic in the Channel-
Southern North Sea area.
The Belgian Navy provides training for merchant
marine deck officers and cooperates fully with COMIXMAR
(Committee for Maritime Traffic) which is a Belgian civil
organization similar to NATO's Naval Control of Shipping
Organization (NCSO). The purpose of this committee is
to control and direct the movements of all merchant
vessels to prevent accidents in peacetime and to preclude
enemy attack during a conflict period. The importance
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and seriousness of this committee is reflected by the fact
that the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the Army
(or his personal representative), and the Director General
87
of Maritime Affairs serve on it. ' The navy has also
instituted the BELMAR Program whereby Belgian merchantmen
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utilize a communications system using navy channels.
Thus, the merchant fleet can be kept in direct contact
with appropriate naval forces when the system is activated.
Additional services to the merchant fleet during
peacetime are provided by the three coast radar stations
and Scheldt Radar System during periods of inclement
weather. This system could also be utilized to direct
vessels around known mine danger areas and obstructions
such as wrecks during a wartime period, assuming vessels
were otherwise able to transit through the area.
b. Coastal Security and Santiation of Vital
Sealanes
The North Sea covers an area of 164,000 square
miles to an average depth of 308 feet. It is not only
one of the world's five smallest major bodies of water,
but is also one of the three shallowest bodies of water
89
which are also principal maritime routes. The coastal
routes and approach routes in the Southern North Sea are
the best suited for minelaying of all maritime areas in
the world. The water depths seldom exceed 30 to 40
meters (about 100 to 130 feet) and it is in these shallow
waters where shipping dominates. Consequently, mine
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warfare and mine countemeasures are of principal concern
to the Belgian Navy in the protection of seaborne commerce
as emphasized by two German naval officers in their
recent article entitled, "Shallow Water Warfare in
Northern Europe," when they said,
(f )or the main types of mines a water
depth of at least 6 meters (about 20 feet)
may be presumed aa the lower employment
limit. Moored mines within the coastal
waters of the European area are bound to
a maximum depth. Bottom mines may be
employed in water depths up to about 60
meters (about 200 feet). Thus, all
normal main shipping routes in the North
Sea meet all the requirements for mine
warfare, so that all types of mines must
be expected in these waters. The routes
which are being used are generally the
shortest connections along the coast and,
therefore, they have very shallow water,
and are the focal points of shipping.
For this reason they are especially
suitable for minelaying.90
Therefore, the Belgian Mine Warfare Flotilla
must be ready not only to detect the presence of sea
mines, but also be capable of neutralizing them to prevent
an interrupted flow of maritime traffic . Depending upon
the scope of possible enemy mining activity, diversion
routes might also be required within the constraints of
water depths and the drafts of merchant vessels. At the
extreme, it may be necessary to guide convoys through
known minefields or around sunken vessels in order to
continue the delivery of essential war materials. Natural-
ly, this scenario could also include protection from hostile
air and surface attacks which would only serve to further
complicate an already dangerous operation.
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An additional task within the scope of the mine
warfare forces is the establishment of totally new sea
routes in time of war. This would require MCM search
operations to ensure that the areas involved were free of
mines, and the planting of "buoys for navigation,
c. Coastal Surveillance and Interdiction
The peacetime surveillance and interdiction
role has undergone a tremendous increase in activity in
recent years. The navy cooperates frequently with the
Ministry of Justice to assist in the suppression of
smuggling in Belgium's territorial waters. During the
past several years coordination between INTERPOL and the
national authorities has resulted in the successful inter-
diction and arrest of narcotics smugglers in Belgian
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and Netherlands' waters.
Since Belgium does not have a separate coast
guard, all of the functions assigned to that service in the
United States fall under the province of the Belgian
Navy. Consequently, the navy cooperates with customs
officials, the maritime police, and state police in all
matters concerning maritime affairs.
During wartime the navy is responsible for the
detection and destruction of hostile shipping. Due
to the size of the Belgian Navy this wartime task would
be executed in cooperation with NATO and would probably
be conducted at the approaches to the English Channel, the
Baltic, and the North Sea.
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d. Fisheries Protection and Control
Existing international agreements provide that
each maritime state is responsible for its territorial
waters and has exclusive supervision over fishing and
other marine resources within them. Each nation is charged
with the responsibility to conduct fisheries protection
and control over its own fishing fleet as well as the
fleets of other nations who are signatories to the
92following conventions
:
London Convention - 5 April 19^6 - on size
of nets and fishcatches
in the Atlantic and
Artie Oceans.





London Convention - 9 March 1964 - on fish-
ing rights in Western
European waters.
London Convention - 1 June 1967 - on fish-




Rome Convention - 23 October 1969 - on
conservation of bio-
logical resources in the
South Eastern Atlantic
Ocean.
Copenhagen Arrangement - 18 December 1973 -




The Belgian fishing fleet is small, consisting
of 231 vessels, 91 of which are over 100 gross registered
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tons. ^ The fishing industry, a slowly declining sector
of the economy, employs only 2,200 men, many of whom are
foreigners. The primary reason for this decline is the
lack of investment in modern equipment because fishing is
not looked upon as an attractive way of earning one's
aZj,
livelihood in Belgium.
Despite the fact that the fishing industry is
declining, Belgium must continue to conduct periodic
patrols in the areas frequented by her fishermen. Fisheries
protection cruises are carried out in the North and Irish
Seas under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture
to provide medical and technical assistance, control over
fish size and catch limits, and to ensure territorial
restrictions are not being violated.
All of the coastal states of the Northeast
Atlantic Ocean except Norway and Iceland have a 12-mile
Exclusive Fishery Zone. The London Convention of 9 March
1964 established a special fishing zone in the outer six
miles of the 12-mile zone wherein nations which have
habitually fished in the outer zone between 1953 and- 1963
could not be denied the opportunity to continue to use
those waters. Each coastal state was granted the right to
regulate the fish catch within its outer zone, but could
not substantially alter the nature and fishing operations
of guest nations.^ Additionally, the 20 October 1970
EEC Fishing Agreement requires each member to ensure equal
conditions of access to waters subject to their jurisdiction
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for all fishing vessels flying the flag of an EEC member
state and registered in the community. However, the
treaty of accession of Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland
effectively suspended this agreement until 31 December
1982 by authorizing each EEC state to restrict access
to fishing areas within six miles of the coast to vessels
that have traditionally fished there and which operate
from a nearby port. Thus, by 1983 all of Belgium's
waters will be open to all fishing vessels from EEC
member nations.
e. River Surveillance and Control
The navy is also tasked with the responsibility
to assist in maritime control on the Scheldt and Meuse
Rivers. Naval units are primarily engaged in surveillance
operations on the Scheldt River where they render assistance
as requested by merchant vessels or Belgian customs agents.
Additionally, the river radar system provides safe naviga-
tion to transiting vessels during periods of low visibility.
Fog is a particularly serious problem throughout the North-
ern European area making such a system mandatory. River
patrol boats located at Kallo under the direction of the





2. Secondary Mission Areas
a. Search and Rescue
Aid to mariners in distress is a most important
and highly appreciated aspect of the navy's service to
the nation and to foreign seamen requiring assistance.
For this purpose three inshore minesweepers act as Ready
Duty Ships (RDS) and take turns as rescue and assistance
ships 24-hours a day, seven days a week. In addition, the
navy and the air force maintain at least one helicopter on
24-hour alert at the Belgian Air Force Base in Koksijde.
Thus, the armed forces are ready to render technical and
medical assistance at a moment's notice within the entire
area of Belgian territorial waters, coasts, and harbors.
Such assistance includes towing, fire fighting, medical
evacuation, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and treat-
ment of divers at the navy's fully equipped decompression
98facilities in Ostend.
b. Explosive Ordnance Clearance and Demotition
Although the Clearance-Divers Section of the
Belgian Navy consists of only seven officer and about 66
enlisted personnel, it is responsible not only for the
disposal of all explosives at sea and ashore (including
EOD services to all ships berthed in Belgian harbors) , but
also for the instruction and training of all divers in the
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navy and the other services. Personnel are divided
into three groups: the Operational Underwater Explosive
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Team, the Operational Landmine Team, and the Instruction
Team which trains the EOD crews for all the services and
the Belgian State Police.
The importance and contribution of these EOD
teams cannot be overstated because an inestimable quantity
of explosives are still scattered throughout Belgium and
her territorial sea. Invariably, explosive devices are
discovered during MCM exercises, during excavation opera-
tions for new building, and along the beaches after major
storms. Additionally, as the field of mine warfare
continues to stress minehunting over minesweeping, diving
operations will continue to grow in importance since that
is the primary method of neutralizing sea mines in the
absence of the French PAP system,
c . Sea Control
As mentioned above with respect to protection
of Belgium's sea lines of communication, the Belgian Navy
has only limited assets available to execute the type of
operations included under the rubric of sea control. In
a generic sense, sea control as a naval strategy must be
considered a secondary mission due to the small size and
composition of the Belgian Navy. In wartime Belgium would
be hard pressed to protect merchant vessels and maintain
safe sealanes within the immediate vicinity of her coasts,
assuming vessels managed to reach the Belgian coast. The
navy would not be able to conduct operations in the open
oceans and still provide protection to its own coast
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except in cooperation with her allies. Once again, due
to the small size- of her fighting fleet, Belgium would
only be able to provide a small contribution. However,
that contribution, no matter how small, would add to the
forces of the allied effort and must not be considered
insignificant
.
Consequently, Belgium, like her neighbor
West Germany, must be classified as having a coastal
defense strategy as both are unable to "command the sea."
This does not, however, mean that Belgium's forces are
impotent. As Admiral Stansfield Turner has put it, the
new term 'sea control 1 is intended to connote "more
realistic control in limited areas and for limited
101periods of time." Additionally, this new conception
of sea control evolved due to the limits on ocean control
brought about by the development of the submarine and
airplane. Many naval strategists doubt whether even the
larger navies are capable of successfully executing sea
control missions except under heavily qualified conditions,
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and then for only limited periods of time. In this
field, Belgium would concentrate upon sea control objec-
tives within her immediate coastal vicinity and as
assigned by NATO authorities while relying upon her allies
for sea control within the larger sphere of the Atlantic




As one would expect, the Belgian Navy has
played only a small role in the intelligence collection,
analysis, and distribution mission. Collection of
intelligence has been primarily on an "opportunity" basis
and invariably in close cooperation with NATO under the
aegis of the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area
103located at Northwood, United Kingdom. J Belgium relies
heavily upon the NATO Intelligence Organization for 'real-
time' intelligence which is normally passed via national
channels. Intelligence reporting is normally done via
national channels to the NATO Surveillance Coordination
Centers unless it is "time-critical." Then it is passed
directly to the nearest NATO command with which communica-
tions can be established.
Intelligence operations will undoubtedly in-
crease in scope, intensity, and importance as the new
Belgian frigates are fully integrated into the fleet. The
anti-air, anti -surface, and anti-submarine roles of the
frigates will require, as well as provide, a step-level
increase in intelligence information in order to be ready
to counter a potential enemy. To that end the frigates
will be integrated into squadrons of the Royal Netherlands






e. Oceanographic Research and Data Collection
Although there is only one Belgian oceanographic
research ship (a former coastal minesweeper) , many naval
vessels have executed oceanographic operations in the
coastal region of Belgium to determine the biological
environment of the North Sea. The Mathematical Model of
the North Sea Project conducted in cooperation with other
North Sea nations is an attempt to discover the patterns
and characteristics of the changes in the North Sea due to
pollution by heavy metals, chemicals, and oil. The Belgian
effort in cooperation with the Naval Research
and Development Division in Ostend consists of more than
200 researchers from laboratories, universities, and
research institutes of various government ministeries.
Additional pollution control and testing
programs are conducted by the navy and the Belgian Federa-
tion of Petroleum Producers to develop, test, and evaluate
new methods of pollution control along the coast and in
1 o f\
the river Scheldt. In 1971 Belgium became the pilot
nation in the investigation of oil spills under the
auspices of NATO . The navy currently maintains approx-
imately 15 minesweeper-sized vessels which can be equipped
with anti -pollution material on a very short notice.
Belgium's location and vast experience in shipping makes
107her ideally suited to lead this important program.
Scientific research in oceanography and physics
is also conducted in cooperation with the NATO MILOC
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Organization, civilian universities, and various European
Economic Community (EEC) agencies. Data Collection on
currents, bottom contours, and mine burial are contin-
uing projects of great importance with respect to MCM
operations. In cooperation with the Belgian-Netherlands
Mine Warfare School several excellent local area charts
have been produced to enhance the minehunting effort of
the operating forces.
f . Show the Flag and Goodwill Cruises
Although this mission is treated last, it
cannot be considered the least important. Indeed, for a
small nation this mission could be most important and
fruitful if properly planned and executed. The concept
of trade following the flag is an ancient one of consider-
able importance to a nation such as Belgium. As indicated
above, Belgium must export approximately 50 percent of her
production to pay for its imports. New markets are always
a welcome addition to a nation's economy, and a nation
such as Belgium may be able to establish relations and
eventually markets with nations that might be hesitant to
deal with a larger western power. Additionally, the new
frigates are the first major warships produced by Belgian
shipbuilders who would surely welcome orders for them from
foreign nations. With this in mind, the new frigates will
begin making goodwill cruises in 1979 in cooperation with
the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Trade
under the aegis of the Belgian Ministery of Foreign Affairs
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Although general trade remains extermely important,
Belgium would profit greatly from an expanded ship-
109building industry.
Second, the political effect of goodwill
cruises to nonaligned countries by small nations of the
western alliance is increasingly important. Small nations
are often viewed as rather harmless and not imperialistic.
Consequently they pose no perceived threat to nonaligned
or non-western nations. Nonetheless, a warship "is a
parcel of national sovereignty. . . .a sort of floating
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embassy." It represents its nation and can carry with
it the western philosophy and culture in foreign ports
where ships of larger nations may not be welcome. At the
same time, by acting as a sort of ' ambassador-at-large,
'
a visiting ship of a small nation still reflects the
concern for the host nation by the countries of the west.
For example, during the 1976 goodwill cruise of the
Belgian Navy, the Zinnia (A-961) visited ports in Algeria,
Tunisia, Sicily, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
NeedJeas to say, friendly relations were not the only
reasons for such a line-up. The immediate concern was
probably to ensure an uninterrupted supply of oil from
Saudi Arabia and a sort of acknowledgement of that
country's help during the oil crisis in 197^ when Belgium's
oil was allowed to continue flowing through Rotterdam.
One can also speculate that a concern was being registered
for the successful resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict
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by consecutive visits to Greece and Turkey. This writer
assumes that the visit to Egypt was to confirm Belgium's
relations with a "western oriented" Egypt and to improve
commercial ties. In all of these cases Belgium acted as
a sovereign state and yet its ship carried with it the
realization that Belgium was in NATO and the Western
111
camp. In such cases cruises can play a significant
part in the West's desire to establish and maintain good
relations with nations which are either nonaligned or of a
potentially hostile ideological persuasion.
E. TEMPO OF OPERATIONS
Although, with the launching of the new frigates, 1976
may be considered a major turning point of the Belgian
Navy, it was in 1977 and 1978 that the tempo of operations
was altered dramatically due to the enlargement of the
fleet. In January 1977 the Belgian Navy roster consisted
of ^,381 personnel onboard with an authorized limit of
^,^-86. In January 1978 the limit was reduced to ^,^37
personnel with ^-,^09 actually onboard. Thus, the fleet
has been increased by four new frigates with a peacetime
personnel authorization of 1^0 per ship while personnel
limits have been reduced. Many MCM units have experienced
a reduction in crew levels to make personnel available for
the initial break-in and testing periods for the frigates.
In many cases the losses to the MCM flotilla represent the
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most highly qualified officers and petty officers of the
navy. Through a policy of "rationalization and judicious
redistribution of total available resources" the navy has
112
attempted to maintain the MCM effort unaltered. Need-
less to say this has required a reduction of the number of
ships in active service, which tends to exacerbate further
the problem of executing all required missions. However,
this problem is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the
navy has been almost exclusively MCM oriented since the
decommissioning of the old Algerine Class escort-mine-
sweepers in 1966-1969. Therefore, all personnel are MCM
oriented and should be able to provide an adequate level
of expertise despite the loss of what must be considered
the most highly motivated and capable personnel to the
four frigates. This problem will be alleviated to some
extent after the initial trials and acceptance periods cf
the frigates as the navy will probably place two frigates
in reserve and establish a rotation system to allow two
frigates to remain in active service. The navy is well
versed in the rotational- ship concept which is treated more
fully in Chapter IV.
Finally, with the increased capabilities of the pre-
sent ocean minesweepers equipped with the French PAP
system, the navy can adequately carry out its peacetime
missions with fewer ships. PAP is the French wire-guided
mine disposal device equipped with a television camera.
The PAP vehicle is guided via sonar to the mine-like
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contact in order to visually identify the contact. If the
contact is a mine,' a demolition charge is released by
remote control from the PAP, after which time the vehicle
is recovered prior to detonation of the charge. PAP is
the French abbreviation for Poisson Auto Propulse or self-
propelled fish. This MCM device speeds-up the minehunting
rate and allows the navy to accomplish its MCM missions
with fewer ships.
It is rather ironic that Belgium has too many ships
and too few people to man them. This situation is
reminiscent of the mid-fifties when Belgium built up her
minesweeping fleet from 8 to ^5 sweepers. Eventually she
was able to cut back in numbers while still maintaining
an excellent MCM capability. This was primarily due to
the improved technology of minehunting sonars and to
combining several types of sweeping equipment on one
113
ship. J Similarly, the new trinational MCM vessel now
in the prototype-building phase will allow a further
reduction in numbers of ships required to accomplish
1 \lif
Belgium's mine warfare missions adequately.
In general, Belgian naval vessels spend almost twice
as much time as those of the United States Navy at sea
conducting exercises, individual ship's training, training
for the Merchant Marine School students and naval cadets,
public relations cruises, and fisheries protection opera-
tions to name but a few functions. Care must be taken
when analysizing the at-sea time as, more often than not,
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the ships are operating in the immediate vicinity of their
homeports and return to port each evening. The exceptions
to this routine are the flagship of the MCM flotilla and
the units assigned to the Standing Naval Forces which
experience an even higher tempo of operations due to their
missions. For example, the MCM flagship participates in
almost every MCM exercise conducted by national, allied,
or NATO authorities in the North Sea-Channel-Northeast
Atlantic area while only one or two of the three MCM
squadrons may be taking part in any particular exercise.
During this writer's assignment to the Belgian Navy, the
flagship of the MCM flotilla spent over 50 percent of the
1 1 K
time at-sea.
Since the frigates are not yet integrated into the
fleet and available for national operations, the majority
of the missions are executed by the MCM flagship, three
ocean minesweepers (MSOs) , three coastal minesweepers
(MSCs), and three inshore minesweepers (MSIs) . One
MSO is assigned to STANAVFORCHAN and is not available to
the navy except in the case of a national emergency.
Three additional MSIs are used almost exclusively as
Ready Duty and survey ships, and one converted MSC is the
navy's primary research platform. Several additional
ships are manned by reserve personnel and used exclusively
for training purposes. Finally, there are four MSOs,
one MSC, and three MSIs in rotational-reserve undergoing
maintenance, repair, or overhaul. (See Chapter III for
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complete details on the Belgian fleet.) The navy does not
have the quantity of personnel required to keep all ships
in active service, and at the same time the navy probably
does not need all the ships it possesses to successfully
carry out its missions. Nevertheless, the navy could use
a few of the ships in reserve to ease its burden if person-
nel were available. Table I is a partial summary of the
scope and intensity of the operations of this small but
effective force.
In conclusion, one is tempted to recall Alain Enthoven's
statement and decide that it makes no sense for Belgian
to have a ^,200 man navy; but rather Belgium should have
a much larger naval personnel force to accomplish those
missions which are associated with coastal nations that
depend upon maritime trade. The navy possesses sufficient
ships but lacks the personnel to man them. Furthermore,
each international convention dealing with laws of the
sea has reiterated the fact that each nation is responsible
for insuring compliance in its territorial waters. The
general adoption of the 200 mile limit currently under
consideration would increase the area of Belgium's terri-
torial waters by a factor of twelve. The navy would be
hard pressed to maintain surveillance within the enlarged
area and still carry out all of its other missions.
Finally, there has been increased attention directed




OPERATIONS OF THE BELGIAN NAVY - 1977 (except as
noted)
- nautical miles steamed: 184,319
- sea-days steamed: 2,083
- river patrol miles steamed: 10,433
NATO and Multinational Operations:
- 2 major MCM exercises
- 1 MSO with STANAVFORCHAN
- 1 NATO -wide Command Post Exercise
Training Cruises:
- 2 for students of the Merchant Marine School, Antwerp
- 2 for cadets from the Royal Military Academy, Brussels
- 2 for students of the Naval Indoctrination School,
Brugge
- 3 for NAVCLEARMIN (Clearance-Divers)
- 1 MCM work-up cruise for each unit
- 1 MCM summer cruise for each unit
- 1 HDO cruise (Helicopter Direction Officer Training)
- 2 reserve personnel
Public Relations:
- 1 goodwill cruise to Africa - 2 months
- 34 public relations day cruises for 2,480 passengers
- 49 visits to foreign ports
NAVCLEARMIN (Clearance -Divers Section)
:
- 643 missions executed
- 34,229 Kg of explosives neutralized, 18,753 of which
were exploded in the sea. This represented the
largest quantity since the period 1959-1960.




- 3 in North Sea and Irish Sea, 135 days total during
which time 143 ships of various nationalities were
examined. 25 ships required technical, logistic,
and/or medical assistance.
Rescue and Assistance:
- over 200 helicopter flight hours per year involving
sea rescues
- 1973-1976, 30 civilians received treatment at the
Naval Decompression Center in Ostend.
- arrival and departure assistance is provided approx-
imately 50 times per year to the Ostend-Dover ferries.
Oceanographic Research and Pollution Control:
- 1975 and 1976 over 500 missions, many of which were
pollution research studies.





- participation at Queen Elizabeth II* s Silver Jubilee
Fleet Review
- participation at the Kieler Woche
- participation at Cowesweek
- participation in 9 additional national and foreign
special events or national days.
SOURCES: Witboek van Landsverdediging , "Reunion d'
Information Force Navale," Operationele
Richtli.jnen Voor 1977 , and "Een Greep uit
Fredestijd. " Table I is a partial compilation
of the data found in each of these sources.
7^

recognition to the possibility of making such missions more
than just a national undertaking. It is not inconceivable
to envision some form of multinational force to protect the
resources of the North Sea either under a NATO, multilateral,
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or EEC agreement in the future. Should such an agree-
ment evolve, all nations must be ready to participate.
This would add yet another mission to the Belgian Navy's
requirements and make it even more difficult to accomplish
its responsibilities. Thus, an increase in the size of
the navy would be most reasonable in peacetime and most
welcome in periods of conflict.
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IV. THE BELGIAN FLEET
A. OVERVIEW
As noted above, the Belgian fleet, as we know it today,
traces its beginning to 3 April 1941 with the establish-
ment of the Royal Navy Section Beige (RNSB). Thereafter,
and until the end of World War Two, the RNSB sailed and
fought in the ships provided by the British Admiralty.
On 1 February 1946, the Belgian Navy, designated the
Zeemacht-Force Navale was established under the Ministry
1 1 fl
of Communications. The navy was transferred to the
Ministry of Defense and recognized as the third branch of
the armed forces on 1 March 1949.
Belgium signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April
1949, the treaty and subsequent NATO agreements committed
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the nation to maintaining and enlarging its naval forces.
The first fleet acquisition program was directed toward
the purchase of sufficient escort ships and mine counter-
measures vessels to counter the ASW and MCM threat. By
the late fifties this program provided the navy with more
than 60 vessels including 8 British and Canadian Algerine
Class escort minesweepers and 45 new minesweepers built
120
either in the United States or Belgium. During these
early years the navy's MCM tradition became well establish-
ed in the minds of its NATO allies. In fact, Belgium's
MCM expertise became so well established that many people
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failed to recognize that Belgium also emphasized merchant
ship protection and convoying as its primary mission
areas. Moreover, it was convoy operations which had earned
the RNSB many plaudits during the war. The Ministry of
Defense in providing the navy with its missions on 9
February 19^8 had identified convoy escorting and coastal
121protection as the two most important mission areas.
Consequently ASW and MCM operations were expected to re-
ceive the highest priority. In the event, MCM received
virtually all the attention at the expense of the navy's
ASW capability.
The Belgian MCM fleet had been established in recogni-
tion of the serious threat posed by mine warfare in the
relatively shallow waters of the English Channel and North
Sea. Furthermore, mine countemeasures vessels were cheap
to build and maintain compared to frigates or destroyers,
and the latter required a greater expenditure of men and
material to operate. Thus, MCM was seen as an area of
naval operations well-suited to a small navy with limited
funds, manpower, and political support. Moreover, the
navy would be unable to accomplsih both ASW and MCM re-
quirements within the constraints imposed upon it. There-
fore, despite formal mission statements, MCM was con-
sciously selected as the primary role of the navy until
such time as it could afford to build-up its ASW capability.
The second fleet program began in the mid-sixties to
provide the navy with two Belgian-Build Mine Countermeasurers
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Support and Command Ships (MCSC) and the modernization of
the MCM fleet. The MCM support and command ships were
designed to allow the MCM fleet a greater degree of mobility
by providing a full range of logistic support and major
repair capability at sea and in distant locations. Add-
itionally, the command and control facilities of the MCSC's,
oriented toward the task group commander, provided for on-
scene direction and coordination of operations. The fleet
improvement program also provided for the installation of
the latest MCM sonars and mine destruction equipment such
as the French PAP system.
The navy's (supposedly) primary escort mission was
not, however, forgotten. As early as 196^ the navy sub-
mitted its first ship acquisition plan to replace the then
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aging Algerines. Unfortunately, these plans were not
accepted by the government until 1969, the same year the
123last escort vessel was retired from service. v Consequently,
the navy lost its limited capability to protect the
nation's merchant fleet and sea lines of communications.
Today the Belgian Navy is in the midst of its third
and fourth fleet programs which were adopted in 1971 and
1975 > respectively. The navy's new frigates comprise the
third program and are the first major warships to be designed
124>
and built in Belgium. Their primary role is to regain
the Zeemacht ' s mission to protect shipping in the Western
Approaches to the Atlantic and North Sea. The fourth
fleet acquisition program is embodied in the Trinational
7s

Minehunter Program with Belgium, France, and the Nether-
lands as joint partners. These new trinational MCM vessels
are being designed to replace the aging MCM fleets of each
participant as well as to provide a smaller, more capable
fleet to serve each nation and NATO
.
Appendix A is an overview of the Belgian naval fleet
as of 1 January 1979 • Although ^8 vessels are listed in
Appendix A, not all ships are in active service. The
navy utilizes a rotational-ship or rotational-reserve
system which allows it to possess the number of vessels
it determines necessary to execute its wartime missions.
The navy personnel authorization is too small to man all
of its ships, except in an emergency. Therefore, several
ships are always maintained in reserve, depending upon
operational needs and the availability of personnel. Two
levels of readiness exist in the reserve fleet; unmanned,
ready for immediate use, and unmanned, under overhaul or
major repair. This allows a great deal of flexibility in
planning and ensures replacements to active fleet units
which experience major casualties. Furthermore, it allows
maintenance, upkeep and major repairs to be done in an
efficient manner without reducing the size of the active
fleet. (See Chapter V for additional information on the
rotational-ship system.)
Finally, Belgium also recognizes its need for fast
coastal patrol boats to assist in coastal defense and
maritime police duties. Unfortunately, the lack of funds
79

prevents the navy from embarking on such a program in the
12*5
near future. Perhaps such an acquisition will constitute
the fifth fleet program in conjunction with replacing the
existing river patrol boats which are all over 25 years old.
B. FRIGATE SQUADRON 181
The four ships of Squadron 181' represent the most
modern guided missile frigates (FGMs) in NATO Europe and
a large contribution to the NATO ASW effort; an effort
which has been increasingly urged by the major NATO
commanders. Both SACLANT and CINCHAN continually urge
members to increase the quantity and quality of NATO's
ASW effort in the North Sea, English Channel and Western
Approaches to the Atlantic. Soviet diesel submarines,
especially the Foxtrot class, are considered the greatest
threat in the North Sea area because limiting depths of
about 50 fathoms make it inadvisable to risk the use of
nuclear subs in this area. Soviet nuclear hunter-killer
submarines are believed to be the greatest danger in the
English Channel-Western Approaches due to the distance
from Soviet naval bases and the tremendous temptation that
maritime choke point provides to interdict shipping.
Submarines in these areas would be masked by the high
noise density of large merchant ships and extremely
difficult to detect by ASW forces, especially in view of
the limited numbers of ASW vessels to patrol this 164,000
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square mile area. Therefore, the modern Belgian frigates
are a very welcome addition to NATO and allow the Zeemacht
to execute its primary mission for the first time in over
a decade.
1 . Frigate Capabilities
These 28 knot frigates are outfitted with four
MM 38 Exocet launchers which are the most advanced anti-
shipping, surface-to-surface missiles in NATO. This 17
foot, 1,600 pound weapon carries a 330 pound shaped-charge
warhead and has a range of 20.5 nautical miles at mach
O.96. ' A single mount 100 mm dual-purpose gun firing a
13-5Kg projectile provides anti-surface and anti-air de-
fense to ranges of 17 Km and 8 Km respectively. This gun
also meets the NATO standardization requirements in being
medium-calibre and has a high altitude capability of 80
degrees to supplement the ship's 8-cell NATO sea Sparrow
SAM system. Consequently, the anti-air defense system
is capable of providing point defense against low and
medium altitude aircraft and missiles. Additional space
has been reserved for the future installation of a close-in-
weapons-system (CIWS) which some observers feel is necessary
to provide adequate point defense.
The ASW suite of the new frigates consists of the
Westinghouse (Canada) medium range SQS 505A sonar and two
medium range torpedo launchers with L5 homing torpedoes.
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A short-range Bofors sextuple 375nim anti-submarine rocket
120launcher complements the French Lg heavy torpedo system.
The new Belgian frigates, like most small combatants,
cannot perform all surface naval tasks. They can, however,
perform most tasks as well as larger ships when limited
to their area of responsibility. For some functions these
ships are obviously superior, and for other tasks within
their capabilities, they are cost-effective when compared
with major units employed for the same tasks. The major
short-comings of these frigates appear to be the absence
of helicopter landing facilities and a variable-depth sonar
(VDS) . Despite studies which indicate that helicopters
are not fully effective on ships of less than 3»0°0 tons,
the addition of a rocket launcher (the Bofors 375) does
not appear to compensate for the loss of air capability in
a multipurpose naval platform. The use of a smaller
Bofors launcher and lighter torpedo system would have
provided a partial solution in space and topside weight,
as well as cost, which were the major considerations to
eliminate the helo-deck. Moreover, since these frigates
are destined to operate in STANAVFORLANT , it would have been
convenient to ensure similar flight capabilities to those
incorporated in most modern frigates. Although the VDS
may not be necessary in some parts of the Belgian opera-
tions areas, there are many areas in the North Sea and
Western Approaches where only VDS will provide adequate
sonar detection. Finally, the lack of redundancy should
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the single mount fail, dictates an early retrofit of the
CIWS package. This is a similar problem among many
navies today, as modern naval construction favors one single
mount gun on almost all ships.
Presumably, costs were the primary consideration
in systems selection. It is likely that the navy could not
convince the decision makers to approve all their desires.
Nevertheless, the Belgian frigates are very capable war-
ships which possess a high degree of fighting capability.
2 . Standardization and Cooperation
The new Belgian frigates are not only excellent
ships, but also outstanding examples of what can be
accomplished through international cooperation. The
casual observer of maritime affairs might dismiss their
significance out-of-hand due to the small number involved.
That would be unfortunate as the overall program has great
significance because it represents a step-level increase in
the scope and breadth of standardization and cooperation
between NATO allies.
The frigate program from its inception was
directed toward maximum standardization with respect to
its military package of weapons, sensors, communications,
and associated system. Emphasis was placed on cost reduc-
tion, national design and construction, and procurement
of foreign systems only if compensated by purchases in
Belgium of similar equipment for equivalent value. Despite
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these rather awesome constraints, the frigates are 50
percent standardized with those of the Royal Netherlands
130Navy and 30 percent with the French Navy. y Additional
standardization was possible but proved difficult and too
expensive due to dissimilarity in tonnage and mission
characteristics of the new frigates in the three navies.
This amount of standardization was only possible
with a high degree of cooperation between Belgium and its
NATO allies. The decision to design and construct a new
class of frigates with technical assistance from other
navies was selected instead of buying an existing ship
from allies or building a new ship under license. It was
determined that the risks of own-design and construction
provided maximum economic returns, was good for the
country's industrial technology, and provided the navy
and the nation with a new capability and level of experience
Prior to the frigate program, design and construction of
major warships had never been attempted by Belgium's
shipbuilding industry. Therefore, a high degree of modem
warship technology was acquired by the nation through the
131program . J
Extensive technical assistance was provided by
the Royal Netherlands and French Navies during every phase
of the program. Moreover, logistic support agreements
between these nations cover the maintenance, repair and
overhaul of most major systems in the naval shipyards of
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the nation which supplied the equipment. Additional
technical assistance was provided by Canada, Italy, Norway,
the United Kingdom and United States.
After the frigates became operational, each ship
performed its Safety and Operational Sea Training (SOST)
in Portland, U.K. under the Royal Navy. Four to five
weeks of Basic Operational Sea Training (BOST) was also
provided two frigates by the Royal Navy in 1978. Most
significant, however, is an unusual agreement for routine
operational training and deployment of Belgian frigates
with the Royal Netherlands Navy for k 1/2 months each cycle
period. It is difficult to imagine any such scheme out-
side the NATO alliance, and it certainly represents a high
degree of cooperation between these two navies. Although
multilateral training programs are routine among military
powers, it is unusual to find a nation which allows the
total integration of another nation's units within its
armed forces.
3. Operational Program
Upon completion of the break-in periods for the
four frigates, the navy plans to establish a rotation
system wherein two ships will remain in active service,
one unmanned in ready reserve, and one in overhaul.
Whether or not this will be a permanent program is not
yet determined. In any event, Belgium will have three
frigates available at any one time.
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The tentative operational cycle for the two active
ships will he 18 months divided into three, four and one-
half month schedules separated by short vacation and up-
keep periods. The first period will he spent executing
national missions and individual ship's training; the
second period is devoted to work-up and training in an
operational Dutch squadron and; the last period will
consist of a short deployment with the forces of
STANAVFORLANT. 132
Naval vessels are normally assigned to STANAVFORLANT
for a full operational year to maximize continuity and
enhance training as a combined force. Belgium will un-
doubtedly follow suit and assign one frigate for the full
period of time after the initial frigate crews are fully
trained. As in the case of all new classes of ships, the
"bugs" must be worked-out prior to attempting any long-
term deployments. It is doubtful that Belgium will
commence year-long deployments with STANAVFORLANT before
1980 or 1981.
C. MINE COUNTERMEASURES FLOTILLA 22
The lessons learned from two world wars, Korea, and
even Viet Nam indicate that mine warfare is still an
important aspect of naval warfare, and one which is often
neglected. For example, Table II shows the current
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selected years. The apparent drastic decline in numbers,
although significant, is primarily caused by a serious
reduction in the MCM forces of the United States and total
absence of MCM forces in the Canadian navy. Most of the
other NATO navies have not only maintained their MCM
fleet size, but have also increased their capabilities by
replacing large numbers of small coastal mine counter-
measures vessels (MCMVs) with medium-sized MCMVs which
incorporate sweeping and hunting countemeasures in one
hull. Moreover, the latest state-of-the-art MCM equipment
and techniques are employed which provide a greater level
of MCM capability with smaller fleets.
Despite that fact that the United States has opted
to concentrate almost exclusively on air mine counter-
measures (AMCM) with helicopter mine countermeasures squad-
rons (HMs), the navies of NATO Europe have determined that
MCM-equipped vessels are best-suited for the waters, climate,
and geography of the English Channel, North and Baltic
Seas, and their approaches. Notwithstanding this divergence
in approach to the MCM threat, NATO members agree that no
matter how powerful, skilled, or efficient, the rest of
their naval forces are useless if they can be bottled up
133in port by mines. '"'
The Belgian Navy was born to mine warfare operations.
As noted above, its first mission was to clear the coastal
waters of Belgium after World War Two. Since those early
days mine warfare has played a major role in the navy's
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primary mission of protecting the merchant fleet and the
nation's sea lines of communication. Today the MCM fleet
comprises 27 minesweepers and minehunters plus two command
and logistic support ships. Relying upon the most ad-
vanced techniques and equipment, the navy possesses the
capability to counter every type of mine known to exist.
Specifically, greater emphasis has been placed on mine-
hunting over minesweeping. Recent advances in MCM sonar
performance combined with remote-operating underwater
demolition delivery vehicles provides the MCMVs with a
capability to counter even unsweepable mines and anti-
minesweeper mines. Generally speaking, minehunting is
faster than sweeping as a hunter does not have to contend
with delayed arming mechanisms, ship counters, or a
host of other devices intended to complicate the sweeping
effort. This does not mean, however, that minesweeping
is an obsolete MCM method. Poor sonar propagation condi-
tions and mine burial often require the more traditional
sweeping method which has changed little over the past
three decades.
Prior to a review of the Belgian MCM fleet, it must
be noted that Belgium's most significant contribution to
the NATO MCM effort is through the Belgian-Netherlands
Mine Warfare School which provides the best MCM training
in NATO. J Finally, the research conducted by both Belgium
and the Netherlands in mine burial, bottom contours, sonar
propagation, and other aspects of mine warfare has provided
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NATO Europe with a comprehensive body of knowledge to
successfully counter the mine threat.
1 . Mine Countermeasures Support and Command Ships
(MCSC)
Two MCSCs, the Zinnia and Godetia, provide afloat
logistic support and repair facilities for an entire MCM
task troup and alternately serve as the flotilla flagship.
These ships are actually 325 foot MCM mother-ships with
workshops, magnetic cable retrival and repair facilities,
medical suite, and staff MCM operations centers. Spacious
cargo holds for MCM gear and provisions, plus hydraulic
cranes fore and aft allow the MCSC to operate as an
1 3«5
autonomous unit with its MCM flotilla. y A helicopter
hanger and embarked helo team provides rapid delivery of
spare parts, repair personnel, medical evacuations, and
communications link to units operating at a distance from
the task group commander. The helicopter can also carry
a portable monoplace decompression chamber which allows
the transfer of a diver to the modern, fully equipped two-
man chamber on board the Zinnia. The Belgian Navy is the
only NATO member with this military capability within
its armed forces in Northern Europe. All other navies
must attempt to find a suitable shore-based facility to
treat diving accident victims.
The Zinnia and Godetia offer spacious crew accomo-
dations and are ideally suited for extended deployments.
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As a result, these ships often make fisheries protection
and goodwill cruises when not actively engaged in MCM
activities
.
2. Ocean Minesweepers - Minehunters (MSO - MHSO
)
The navy's seven ocean minesweepers were built for
Belgium in the United States between 1955 and i960. Six
of these wood-hulled vessels are equipped with the
American variable depth MCM sonar, SQQ 1^, and each will
shortly receive the French minehunting disposal device
PAP. J Unfortunately, the magnetic and acoustic sweeping
equipment must be removed to provide sufficient space for
the PAP installation. In gaining the advanced minehunt-
ing capability each converted MSO retains only the
mechanical sweeping gear used against moored mines. Mag-
netic and acoustic or combined sweeping tasks must then
be executed by the coastal minesweepers which are well
suited for Belgium's execution of magnetic -acoustic MCM
taskorders
.
This division of responsibility is still a somewhat
controversial subject as some MCM staffers believe that
only an MSO can produce the high amperages required to
detonate magnetic mines, especially those planted at
maximum effective depths. On the other hand, proponents
of minehunting point to the impressive detection rates of
the hunters over the sweepers, the smaller number of
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ships and men required to execute the same tasks as sweep-
ers, and the significantly reduced time periods required
by hunters to sanitize an area. This writer's experiences
indicate that hunting is far superior to sweeping and that
the loss of magnetic -acoustic capability is small compared
to being able to literally see the bottom with a good sonar
and PAP system. Nonetheless, some degree of magnetic
-
accoustic capability must be retained for those areas not
suitable for minehunting.
The seventh MSO serves as a training and diving
ship for the underwater demolition teams. The only way
to confirm mine-like contacts as mines is by seeing or
exploding the objects. Prior to the introduction of the
PAP system with its television camera and spotlight,
divers were sent down to verify mine contacts, place
explosive charges, or render the mines safe. Although
PAP greatly simplifies this task, divers are still requir-
ed when mine recovery is desired to gather mine intelligence
The diving ship is also equipped with a portable
monoplace decompression chamber in addition to a multi-
place chamber installed on board. In combination with
the facilities of the Zinnia and the ultra-modern facilities
at the Naval Command Ostend, diving accidents, though rare
in occurrence, are rapdily and expertly handled.
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3. Coastal Minesweepers - Minehunters (MSC - MHC
)
The Zeemacht ' s six coastal MCM vessels were built
in Belgium during the years 195^-1956 under the United
137States MDAP Program. *" Four of these vessels are
configured as minesweepers with complete mechanical,
acoustic and magnetic capabilities. Two vessels have been
converted to minehunters and are equipped with the British
hull-mounted sonar MK 193 and with PAP. These MHCs were
the test and tactical evaluation platforms for the PAP
device during 1976 and 1977- The PAP Performance Evaluation
Program results showed a substantial reduction in mine
detection times and an increase in detection rates over
previous minehunting techniques. J
Although coastal minesweepers and minehunters are
well suited to the water depths off Belgium's coast, they
are small vessels with poor seakeeping capabilities during
heavy weather. Crew fatigue is particularly acute in
rough waters, whereas the much larger MSOs can continue to
operate effectively in higher sea states. Nevertheless,
the coastal MCMVs provide a significant MCM capability in
both conventional methods and modern minehunting
techniques
.
k. Inshore Minesweepers (MSI)
As the name implies, inshore minesweepers are the
shallow water workhorses of the MCM fleet. Their
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extremely shallow draft allows them to operate close to
the shoreline and. in rivers and channels where rapid
139
shoaling becomes a problem for the larger MCM units.
Belgium built 16 MSIs between 1955 and 1957; the first
eight with U.S. credit under the Off-Shore Procurement
Program and the remainder with Belgian financing. The
six ships comprising Squadron 219 are presently assigned
to Flotilla 22 as indicated in Appendix A. The ships of
Division 218.1 are permanently assigned to the Naval
Command Ostend as Ready Duty Ships (RDS) . Division 218.2
is dedicated to naval reserve training and operates out
of Kallo under the Naval Command Antwerp. Thus, Flotilla
22 has six MSIs available on a permanent basis but would
be able to draw upon these other units should a crisis
so demand
.
These small MCMVs possess a full range of magnetic,
acoustic, and mechanical sweeping devices which, like those
of all other Belgian sweepers, may be used alone or in
combination. The primary employment of the MSIs is to
execute MCM tasks in the narrow entrance channels, rivers,
and harbors of the nation. Despite the small size of
these vessels they often exercise with their larger counter-
parts in the major North Sea coastal routes and occasion-
ally as far away as the Atlantic coast of France.
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5 . Trinational Minehunter Program
The Belgian government has recognized that the
navy must have new MCMVs if it is to continue to carry
out its NATO responsibilities. By 1980 the MCM fleet will
be more than 20 years old, with many units approaching
30 years of service. Old, wooden ships are dysfunction-
al and costly to maintain due to the types of wood and
skills required to make major hull and deck repairs.
Fortunately, this problem also faced many of Belgium's
allies, and a unique opportunity for cooperation presented
141itself. In response, France, the Netherlands and Belgium
have entered into a joint minehunter design and construc-
tion program as the first stage of a two-stage plan to
increase their MCM capabilities and increase their NATO
142bonds. The first stage comprises the design and con-
struction of a new generation of medium-sized MCMVs and
their logistics supply system. The resulting "Tripartite
Minehunter" is in the prototype construction phase. It
will provide a fully automated minehunting capability for
the detection, classification, identification, localiza-
tion, and neutralization of bottom and moored mines. The
ships will be equipped with the French DUBM 21A twin beam
sonar, an EVEC sonar display system, radar, automatic
radionavigation system, and automatic pilot. J
Delivery dates run from 1979 to 1989 for 15 ships
each for France and the Netherlands and ten ships for
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Belgium. Each country has the option to purchase addition-
al vessels during "the contract period. The Belgian delivery
dates are spaced from 1983 to 1987 • Consequently, the
navy will continue to modernize its existing fleet.
The trinational minehunter has been designed to
provide a modern ship large enough to "be seaworthy in the
Atlantic and yet small enough to operate in Belgian harbors.
Moreover, and perhaps even more important for the Zeemacht ,
these vessels will allow a 33 percent reduction from the
typical MSO crew sizes, for a total saving of 200 personnel
for the ten-ship class.
The second stage of this program will investigate
non-conventional means of countering the mine threat. Al-
though this stage of the MCM program will not reach
fruition until the late 1980 's and early 1990' s, current
thinking involves the possible use of helicopters, hover-
craft, and remote-controlled vehicles to name but three
likely candidates.
As further discussed in the following chapter, the
scope and degree of cooperation between Belgium and her
allies is not only most impressive; it also provides
greater strength to the NATO alliance. Belgium and the
Belgian Navy often act as catalysts in joint ventures which
are inestimable in value to NATO. The frigate and tri-
national minehunter programs are but two examples which
demonstrate such increased levels of cooperation among





As indicated in Appendix A, the navy also maintains
various forces to complement the major fleet units. River
Patrol Squadron 217 consists of six fast patrol boats
engaged in maritime police duties on the Scheldt River
and major inland waterways of Belgium.
Two auxilliary units, Zenobe Gramme and Mechelen, are
assigned to execute national and NATO hydrographic research
projects. Several of these projects are discussed else-
where in this study.
Recognizing the need for additional fleet support
facilities for the new frigates, the navy has recently
converted two MSCs to provide a torpedo and missile recovery
vessel, and a limited degaussing control capability.
Finally, in addition to the normal assortment of yard
and harbor craft, tugs, and small craft, the navy possess-
es a small air arm designated Helicopter Squadron 40. This
squadron consists of one Sikorsky S-58SS1 and three French
SA3116B Alouette III helicopters. The Sikorsky is dedicated
to rescue and assistance operations but also possesses a
limited air mine counter-measures capability which is
seldom utilized. The Sikorsky with an operational radius
of 72 nautical miles is well suited for Belgium's small
coastal area. The Alouette Ills, on the other hand, are
small, fast, and possess a 500 nautical mile range. They
are capable of performing a wide range of tasks either
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embarked on an MCSC or from their normal base of operations,
the Belgian Air Force Base at Koksijde.
The Navy is authorized only seven pilots and the
minimum number of personnel required to service their
aircraft. It is a small naval air community and fully
integrated into the fleet. All pilots are also seagoing
officers who serve in department head and executive officer
billets in ships which conduct extensive helo operations,
and the safety record of the naval air arm is outstanding.
Although the Belgian naval air arm is small it provides
a significant degree of increased mobility to the navy,
especially the MCM task group. This increased mobility is
well worth the expense and effort to maintain a separate
naval air capability, as proven during annual exercises.
The ability to rapidly transfer accident victims, repair
parts and personnel, provisions, and equipment has signifi-
cantly reduced the transit times which were formerly
required for ships to return to port for repairs and
supplies.
E. FLEET TRAINING AND READINESS
The annual training plan is designed to maintain the
fleet at the maximum level of readiness to accomplish its
wartime missions. The Belgian Navy identifies three
phases of training and instruction designed to meet the
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Ik6demands of the individual, the nation, and NATO. The
first phase of operational training is oriented toward
forming highly qualified teams on each ship. Extensive
individual and team training is provided in service schools
and the Mine Warfare School for the MCM fleet. Frigate
personnel receive additional training in service schools
of foreign navies and in programs such as the Belgian-
United States Navy Personnel Exchange Program (PEP)
.
Under the PEP program two officers and three petty officers
serve for two years in major US Navy combatants and gain
valuable experience not obtainable in a smaller navy.
Assignment of Belgian personnel is made to Mediterranean-
deploying units to ensure maximum operational training.
One month of individual ship's training is scheduled
during the first part of each operational year which begins
in January. Independent ship's exercises (ISE) are pro-
grammed by squadron and unit commanders to suit the needs
of their personnel. Upon completion of this "individual
base training" the ship is designated RFE or ready for
exercise
.
The second training phase, lasting three to four weeks,
then begins. Training cruises and national maneuvers under
the authority of COMOPSNAV are executed through the opera-
tional control of the squadron or, preferably, the flotilla
commander. The intent is to ensure that all units are
properly versed in the tactics necessary to make each ship
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ready for participation in allied formations. Once a
ship has successfully passed this "national group training"
it is designated RFD or ready for duty.
The final or third phase of annual training consists
of at least two hi- or multi-lateral exercises and two
large-scale NATO exercises. One Belgian MSO is also
assigned yearly to STANAVFORCHAN, as will one frigate to
STANAVFORLANT in the future. These multilateral exercises
and NATO exercises help to develop common tactics, strategy,
and to foster a greater degree of cooperation among NATO
nations. For example, the French Navy annually invites
its neighboring allies and STANAVFORCHAN to its major MCM
exercise, NORMIMEX. This is usually the most comprehen-
sive MCM exercise in NATO Europe, and it provides all
participants operating experience with their French
counterparts who are not presently in the military structure
of NATO. Moreover, the exercise analyses are widely
distributed and scrupulously studied by all participants.
Training plans are often tailored to the conclusions and
observations of these analyses. Multi-national MCM
exercises, especially NORMINEX, have played a major role
in enhancing NATO's ability to counter the mine threat
in Europe and they continue to play a major part in the
training cycles of each participating nation.
The multi-national phase of frigate training has yet
to begin. However, the Netherlands has agreed to assign
Belgian frigates to fully operational squadrons to ensure
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maximum training for Belgian personnel. Additionally, at
least one major exercise will be included during the assign-
ment period of Belgian ships to Netherlands' squadrons.
Presumably, this will be a major NATO exercise. There is
little doubt that the experience of working with the Royal
Netherlands Navy and STANAVFORLANT will result in a very
high degree of readiness for the Belgian frigates, as is
already the case with Belgium's MCM fleet.
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Y. THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE BELGIAN NAVY
A. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
The King is the Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Armed
Forces as stipulated in the Constitution of 1831 and its
amendments. During World War One and Two, the King physical-
ly led the armed forces and served as a unifying symbol of
patriotism. After the successful resolution of the
150
"Belgian Royal Question" in 1951. the King, although
still legally head of the armed forces under the constitution,
151
was relegated to a figure-head of the military. J As
nominal commander-in-cheif he is no longer expected to be
personally responsible for the defense of the nation, but
rather exercises his constitutional responsibilities and
authority through his Prime Minister and Cabinet who share
overall responsibility for defense policy and control of
the armed forces.
Specific defense decisions and executing directives are
formulated by the Ministerial Committee on Defense which
is presided over by the Prime Minister. The Minister of
Defense implements the policies and decisions of the de-
fense committee through his administration which includes
three elements within an integrated staff echelon that
coordinate planning, operations, and support of the three
branches of the armed forces, the Gendarmerie, and the
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Medical Service. The integrated elements of the Ministry
of Defense are the Gendarmerie General Staff, the Central
152Administration, and the General Staff. ^
The Gendarmerie General Staff is responsible for overall
domestic security and control of the national police - the
Gendarmerie. Although equivalent to state police, the
Gendarmerie are more heavily armed than is necessary to
perform most of the usual police duties. Their training
and organization are oriented toward a possible wartime
153
role in direct support of combat troops. JJ
The Central Administration provides integrated support
to all the armed forces, the Gendarmerie, and the Medical
Service in order to reduce redundancy in each service and
to efficiently administer selective service conscripts. The
Central Administration, staffed by each service and civil-
ians, maintains close liaison with the other general staffs.
The General Staff is the most important element of the
integrated staff echelon and operates similar to the
American Joint Chiefs of Staff System. The Chief of the
General Staff comes directly under the Minister of Defense
to whom he is responsible for the readiness and coordination
of the three armed forces. Compliance with the directives
and policies of the Ministerial Committee on Defense is
coordinated by the Chief of the General Staff with the
heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Medical Service.
An integrated Inter-Service Staff with two deputy chiefs
of staff assists the Chief of the General Staff in carrying
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out his duties. The First Deputy Chief of Staff is responsible
for the coordination of plans, programs, and educational
instruction which apply to all the armed forces. The Second
Deputy coordinates the programs concerning inter-service
problems in the areas of personnel, information, operations,
and logistics. •*
Each of the armed forces and the Medical Service has
its own staff under the direction of its respective chief
of staff who reports directly to the Chief of the General
Staff. These staffs ensure compliance with directives in
force, individual service policies and planning, and make
routine reports concerning the state of readiness of their
assigned forces.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY
The organization of the Belgian Navy is similar to the
United States Navy except that, owing to its size and the
functions of the General Staff and Inter-Service Staff, the
American multiplicity of administrative levels is not re-
quired. The Naval Staff is located in Brussels and presided
over by the Chief of the Naval Staff who is equivalent to
the United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations. The
Naval Staff is responsible for implementing the policies
and decisions of the General Staff which relate to the
navy. As in any headquarters command, the Naval Staff
directs the preparation and submission of budgets, person-
nel management and recruitment, short -and long-range
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planning, procurement of major weapons systems and
ships, information to various governmental agencies, public
relations, and the administration of the Naval Reserve to
name but a few of the tasks which are routinely addressed.
The staff is quite small due to the limited number of
authorized personnel, the requirements of the fleet, and
other subordinate commands, and the number of personnel in
a training status. Approximately three percent of the navy's
strength, about 130-1^0 men and women, are assigned to the
headquarters command which also includes those personnel
155
assigned to inter-service staffs and diplomatic billets.
Thus, personnel must be judiciously utilized in order to
successfully accomplish all required planning, reporting,
and tasking of the General Staff while at the same time
directing the operations of the navy.
The distribution of responsibilities within the Naval
Staff are functionally divided into the following six
Navy Departments which are also duplicated on each sub-
ordinate command level:
N 1 - Personnel and General Administration
N 2 - Information and Security
N 3 - Operations and Planning
N 4- - Supply and Logistics
N 5 - Communications
No- Finances and Budget
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Beneath the level of the Naval Staff the navy comprises
three functional commands, (Operations, Logistics, and
Instruction) , and the Belgian-Netherlands Mine Warfare
School.
1. The Operations Command - COMOPSNAV
The operations Command in Ostend is the operational
control authority (OCA) of the navy. As such, COMOPSNAV
is the naval command with the authority to direct, assign,
deploy, and reform force groupings; in short, it has the
authority for the movements of the fleet. The Commander,
Naval Operations, Belgian Navy exercises full command over
all naval bases and fleet units in active service wherever
they are operating.
COMOPSNAV is also responsible for the protection
of all vessels in the coastal and territorial waters
along Belgium's hz mile coastline. Other areas of coastal
jurisdiction include the Belgian Air-Sea Rescur Sector with
a northern limit of 52 nautical miles and a southern limit
of 21 nautical miles, and a ten nautical mile wide Oil
Pollution Section. Pollution prevention and control within
the harbors and rivers is delegated to the naval base
1S7
commanders. v
The primary task of COMOPSNAV is fleet readiness
to accomplish the navy's wartime missions. Consequently,
annual employment schedules are drafted in the Operations
Command to ensure porper coordination of training cycles,
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overhaul and repair schedules, exercise requirements, and
various miscellaneous missions tasked by the Naval Staff.
In short, COMOPSNAV is the heart of the operating fleet.
Two subordinate commands exist to assist in executing
employment schedules, planning, training and administration,
and to provide logistic support to assigned units. Command-
er, Mine Countermeasures Flotilla 22 (COMFLOT 22 or PLOT 22)
and Commander, Frigate Squadron 181 (COMSQUAD 181 or SQUAD
181), serve as the navy's two type commanders with full
responsibility for training, administration, and logistic
support within their capabilities. (Logistic support is
provided at four echelons in the Belgian Navy: First
Echelon: by the ship; Second Echelon: by the Type Command-
er and naval bases; Third Echelon: by the Logistics Commands
and; the Fourth Echelon: by civilian shipyards or repair
facilities.) The title of the frigate type commander,
COMSQUAD 181, belies that fact that he is equivalent in
rank and authority to COMFLOT 22. Evidently the navy
decided that four frigates could be designated only a
squadron as any other title would sound presumptuous.
FLOT 22 on the other hand, consists of three mine counter-
measures squadrons and the mine countermeasures command
ICQ
and control ship. D
The navy presently operates three naval bases which
provide second echelon logistic support and homeporting
to the fleet. Naval bases are designated Naval Commands
(NAVCOMs) to provide standardization of terminology with
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Belgium's close ally, the Netherlands. Consequently, the
bases at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Antwerp are NAVCOMOST,
NAVCOMZEB, and NAVCOMANT, respectively. (See Map 1)
Naval bases are considered major shore commands with
respect to career patterns and promotion criteria. Each
NAVCOM reports directly to COMOPSNAV for the following
primary responsibilities:
- safety of ships in their port
- second echelon logistic and administrative
support
- defense of the base area and installations
- the operation of the Naval Coastal Radar Chain
- manning the Port War Signal Stations (PWSS)
COMOPSNAV also maintains operational control over the Navy
Clearance-Divers Section with its associated Diving School
and the operation of the Hyperbar Center which is the navy's
159
medical diving and decompression facility. J Naval
communications transmitter and receiver stations, plus the
reserve naval base at Nieuwpoort also fall under the
cognizance of the Naval Command Ostend.
2. The Logistics Command - COMLOGNAV
COMLOGNAV provides third echelon logistics support
to the fleet and is roughly equivalent to a United States
Navy Ship Repair Facility. It encompasses all of the
navy's repair capabilities. Located in Ostend alongside a
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personnel, and several hundred civilian contract employees,
is responsible for the replenishment, maintenance and repair
of the entire fleet.
As in the area of personnel, the problems of a
small navy become quite apparent in the Logistics Command.
First, a shortage of qualified technicians to effect re-
pairs on new, sophisticated equipment requires hiring
civilian technicians or negotiating factory contracts, both
1 f\0
of which are expensive. Whenever possible navy personnel
are trained to repair new equipment introduced into the
fleet. When that is not feasible, naval technicians work
side-by-side with repair personnel from civilian firms.
This on the job training proves very effective in expanding
the capabilities of these technicians. Furthermore, depend-
ing upon the origin of a system, foreign naval assistance
is often written into purchase agreements to provide either
training for Belgian personnel or repair by foreign techni-
cians. For example, a recent agreement between Belgium and
the Netherlands provides for the main overhaul in Dutch
naval shipyards and electronics workshops of all weapons,
sensors, and command systems fitted in Belgian frigates
which are also in use by the Royal Netherlands Navy. Similar
agreements are also in force with the French and British
navies or civilian firms from which equipment was pur-
chased. J In this way the navy is able to expand its
repair capabilities without overextending its present re-
pair and overhaul capabilities. Therefore, COMLOGNAV can
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continue to provide quality repairs within its area of ex-
pertise while gradually acquiring the new skills needed
to maintain the frigates.
A second problem area involves the budget and avail-
ability of repair parts. The navy is small and cannot
afford to stock repair parts on a level normally expected
by larger navies. Naturally, rap-id turnover items are
readily available and the navy stockpiles more than 70,000
spares. Relative to the United States Navy this is a small
number. However, compared to 50,000 spares in the largest
164American assembly plants, the figure is not so small.
Expensive or seldom required spares cannot be maintained
and often must be special ordered from foreign stockpiles.
This causes delays in some cases, but more often than not,
the part is available from one of the ships in reserve.
Thus, cannibalization is an art well-known to the navy.
Moreover, the navy has become expert in fabricating spare
parts which are not available.
One might argue that it would be better to maintain
a full range of spares and cease the practice of having
ships in reserve. This, however, overlooks three important
benefits of the navy's rotational-reserve system. First,
although manpower may not be available to man all the navy's
ships in peacetime, these ships are kept ready for immediate
use in an emergency and could be manned by reserves if
necessary. Second, maintenance, repairs, and overhauls
can be conducted in an efficient manner without reducing the
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number of vessels required to execute peacetime missions.
Third, the navy is. able to maintain the number of ships it
determines necessary to execute its wartime missions.
Moreover, by utilizing the rotational-reserve concept, the
navy has ready replacements for active units which
experience major casualties. The experience of this
writer can attest to the soundness of the Belgian system.
It not only works well, but also keeps the fleet in a much
higher state of readiness, and prolongs the life of the
ships. Compared to United States Navy minesweepers, the
Belgian units are in a considerably higher condition of
preservation and upkeep.
Although the small navy problems of COMLOGNAV have
not been solved, they are recognized and ameliorated as
much as possible by experience and innovative programs.
The area of true expertise at COMLOGNAV is MCM. Having
dealt with primarily MCMVs during the past three decades,
the Logistics Command possesses a wealth of knowledge and
skills in all areas of mine countermeasures vessesl and
systems. The construction and design of the MCM command
and support vessels reflect this expertise as those ships
are capable of providing even major repairs at sea to all
types of minesweepers and minehunters. For example, during
a major MCM exercise in 1977 a FLOT 22 repair team effected
major generator repairs to a coastal minesweeper in less
than 17 hours. The normal time required for such repairs
166
was four da^s, and then only if the ship was at pierside.
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COMLOGNAV provides third echelon logistics support
to the fleet which includes technical inspections, preventive
maintenance beyond the ship's capability, breakdown ser-
vices, and replenishment of foodstuffs, fuel, and consum-
ables. ' The type commanders in cooperation with COMLOGNAV
provide some third echelon logistics by maintaining large
stocks of spares, food, fuel, and consumables within design
capacity. During major exercises or training cruises to
distant areas, supplemental spares are issued to the type
commander to increase his supply support and repair
,.-..,. 168
capabilities.
The task of the Logistics Command is large, and
like any navy's repair facility, judged by performance.
The estimate of this writer is that COMLOGNAV provides
services and repairs, at least if not superior, on a par
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with those of the United States Navy.
3- The Instruction Command - COMIENAV
The Instruction Command or COMIENAV either provides
or coordinates the training for all enlisted personnel in
the Belgian Navy. The importance of training and the emphasis
placed on it by the navy is reflected by the fact that 27
percent of the navy's total manpower authorization is assign-
170
ed to the various training school staffs. '
Current school enrollments account for 12 percent
(about 530 personnel) of the navy's manpower. Consequently,
nearly ^0 percent of the navy is involved in training and
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education either as instructors, administrators or students.
The figure is presently higher than normal due to the more
than 4-0 different courses required for the initial training
171
of frigate personnel. ' Nonetheless it is indicative of
the training required to operate even a small modern navy.
COMIENAV provides all recruits and conscripts five
weeks of basic military instruction which introduces them
to military life. Following this boot camp period advanced
instruction prepares sailors for one of the shipboard
departments: deck, engineering, operations, or supply.
Likewise, personnel going to shore duty receive instruction
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appropriate to their specialization.
The Petty Officer School also comes under COMIENAV
and provides candidates with up to three years of training
and education in one of the three specialization schools
173for deck, engineering, and services personnel. J When
required, additional training is arranged in the service
schools of foreign navies.
Several navy ratings such as hospital corpsman,
military police, disbursing clerks, and chauffers are
taught in various training schools of the Belgian Army.
These quotas are controlled by the Instruction Command
17 Jj,
as the navy's primary training authority. A limited
number of officer courses are given by COMIENAV in the
areas of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, and
damage control, otherwise officers receive most of their
114

training during military school or in foreign navies
175depending upon the needs of the navy.
The overall quality of training and education in
the Belgian Navy is equal to that of other navies as judged
by the performance of naval enlisted personnel. The leading
and chief petty officers possess a greater threoretical
knowledge than their American counterparts, especially
in the area of mine warfare. This may be due to the navy's
long concentration on mine countermeasures or that a com-
parison is not possible due to the United States Navy's
almost constant denigration of mine warfare. Furthermore,
observed performance in the areas of navigation, detection,
helicopter air control, operations during fleet exercises,
and routine steaming indicate a high degree of knowledge and
ability on the part of most petty officers and career sail-
ors. The quality of training is of a high caliber and more
than sufficient to enable the navy to safely and expertly
execute its missions.
k. The Belgian-Netherlands Mine Warfare School -
EGUERMIN
The Belgian-Netherlands Mine Warfare School, EGUERMIN
(l'Ecole de la Guerre de Mines ), is the only institution of
its kind. It stands as evidence of the depth of commitment
to mine warfare and collective security by the governments
of Belgium and the Netherlands. Originally founded in 1958




in all aspects of mine countermeasures and mine warfare.
The first foreign students were admitted in 1961, coming
primarily from West Germany and the Netherlands. A Bi-
lateral agreement signed in 1965 merged the schools of
Belgium and the Netherlands, and the Mine Warfare School in
Den Helder was moved to the Ostend facilities. Funding for
the school, its instruction, and research projects is shared
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equally by the two nations. '' The degree of cooperation
of these two allies in mine warfare is but one more example
of the close relationship between Belgium and the Nether-
lands. It also represents another innovative approach to
provide quality training which allows a small navy the
opportunity to build an effective mission capability in
a cost-effective manner. Moreover, the combined MCM
expertise of the Belgian and Royal Netherlands Navies is
reflected in EGUERMIN being called the "Belgian-Netherlands
Mine University," which is not a great exaggeration.
The Director of the school is responsible to the
chiefs of staff of both navies. Matters concerning policy
and major activities are supervised by an eight man "Super-
vision Council" with equal representation from both navies.
The yearly council meetings are alternately presided over
by the Belgian or Netherlands Deputy Chief of the Naval
Staff. An advisory board composed of two Belgians, two
Netherlanders, and the Director as chairman, provides a
forum to handle all matters concerning instruction. '
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The Training Commander is of the opposite nationality
of the Director. He is responsible for all instruction,
training schedules, and training-related activities. Both
the Director and Training Commander are senior officers in
either the Belgian or Royal Netherlands Navies, the
nationalities of each position are alternated every two or
three years depending upon tour lengths.
Due to the composition of the school's staff many
people think it is a NATO -related organization. Despite
the fact that one officer and one petty officer from the
United States Navy are assigned to EGUERJVUN, it is not a
part of NATO . United States Navy personnel are provided
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under an agreement dating back to 1958. The remainder
of the 8 officer and 18 chief petty officer staff are from
the Belgian and Netherlands Navies.
An additional reason for believing that a NATO
relationship exists is the large number of NATO naval
personnel encountered at EGUERMIN. Approximately 1000
NATO officers and enlisted personnel receive tactical
1 fin
and technical training annually. MCM squadrons from
West Germany, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium
make extensive use of the School's Mine Countermeasures
Tactical Trainer (MCMTT) . Through computer simulation,
the MCMTT provides realistic MCM exercises for watch
and operations teams in ship control booths which are
mock-ups of bridges and combat information centers. The
exercise play is recorded to allow extensive critiques
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following each session covering radio-telephone and signalbook
procedures, MCM tactics and theory, and ship handling. Al-
though the MCMTT is the best MCM tactical trainer in NATO,
it is limited to minesweeping evolutions. Hence, EGUERMIN
plans to install a minehunting simulator and tactical teacher
to be purchased jointly by France, the Netherlands and
Belgium. This will be the most advanced and modern MCM
1 ft 1
facility in existence.
EGUERMIN also offers a broad range of classroom
instruction for all active and reserve naval personnel from
seamen to senior officers. Courses vary from a few days
for refresher training, to 18 weeks for the Mine Warfare
Staff Officer Course. The latter is often attended by
senior NATO officers from almost every NATO member nation.
The instruction staff is very accommodating and can tailor
a course to suit the requirements of the requestor.
Computer assisted wargames are available to MCM
staffs from the task unit to the task force level. This
provides MCM officers an opportunity to test their skills
in areas such as convoy guidance, establishment of diversion
routes, naval control of shipping, and experimental tactics.
Moreover, the participants normally play at a higher level
of authority than they would hold in a live fleet exercise.
This role-playing gives a better appreciation of the
senior operational commander's perspective and the importance
for timely and accurate MCM reporting.
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The staff at EGUERMIN also participates in the
planning, execution, and analysis of NATO and national MCM
exercises. Afloat units can also arrange for real-time
computer assistance during the conduct of an exercise.
This service has not been fully exploited due to the limited
size of the EGUERMIN Staff. During one major MCM exercise
this writer requested and receive-d assistance from the
school in the analysis of a "Short-Term Operation" which
proved highly successful. As indicated, the school staff
is small, and it cannot be expected to man the facilities
round the clock. Hence, exercise utilization is available
only through advance liaison, and then only when the school's
workload permits. Lastly, the services of the staff are
always at the disposal of MCM officers when they are engaged
in the preparation and planning phases immediately prior to
major exercises.
The EGUERMIN staff possesses a wealth of MCM know-
ledge and dispenses it through its multi -faceted training
programs. Consequently, the Belgian-Netherlands Mine War-
fare School makes a significant contribution to the
navies of both countries and to NATO. This contribution
cannot be overstated as anyone who knows anything about
mine warfare in NATO Europe continually returns to





The effective utilization of manpower resources plays
a significant role in the administration and management
of the Belgian Navy. The small number of authorized person-
nel, skyrocketing costs of pay and allowances, increased
length and cost of training, and the reduction in active
service obligation of conscripts have made it imperative
to define precisely all billet requirements to ensure that
qualified personnel, in adequate numbers, are available to
man, operate and maintain the systems employed.
The peacetime navy represents only five percent of the
J
Op
total armed forces with ^,^86 men and women assigned.
The manpower authorization of the navy is set by Parliament
upon recommendation of the Ministrial Committee on Defense
in consultation with the Naval and General Staff. J
Table III shows the strengths of the navy from 1977 through
the projected authorized allowance for 1979' From Table III
it is evident that although the overall size of the navy is
expected to decrease by only 62, the navy will lose 95
naval personnel, experience a large reduction in assigned
conscripts, and probably experience an increase in women
in uniform, assuming that trend continues. To further
complicate the personnel situation, the navy is engaged in
two major ship acquisition programs which require increased
numbers of personnel assigned to sea duty and training
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sophisticated naval vessels. Fortunately, some of these
programs do not overlap and the intention of the Naval Staff
is to provide the nation with a smaller yet more capable
navy thanks largely to modern technology. Nonetheless,
chronic personnel shortages are not new to the Belgian Navy
and it is a credit to their men and women that they are
able to accomplish thier assigned missions successfully under
such austere manning levels. Several of the more salient
aspects of the current personnel situation in the Belgian
Navy are addressed below.
1 . Education and Training Qualifications
a. Officer Personnel
Education plays an extremely important role in
both officer and enlisted development within the Belgian
Navy. All newly commissioned officers must possess the
equivalent of an American baccalaureate degree with the
exception of officers promoted from the enlisted ranks.
Midshipmen in the Royal Military School receive either a
four or five year technical education in science and
engineering. This policy ensures that all unrestricted line
and engineering officers have the appropriate technological
background necessary to operate and maintain the complex
weapons systems of today and the future. This education
also prepares them to perform their responsibilities as
they progress in their military careers. The navy has two
primary methods to upgrade the professional knowledge of
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the officer corps. The first is advanced professional
military education in selected fields of study at the war
colleges of either France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom,
or the United States. Depending upon the needs of the
navy, one or two senior officers per year are assigned to
184
war colleges in cooperation with the host nations. The
purpose of this program is to provide senior officers the
opportunity to broaden their expertise in strategy, tactics,
and defense management. The second method is to provide
specialty courses to selected officers at the service schools
of various foreign navies, usually France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom. Some of these specialty courses
are offered in Belgium through either service schools or the
Mine Warfare School.
Since the officer corps is quite stable, this
professional education provides the navy with a large
cadre of middle grade and senior officers well-versed in
operational, technical, and managerial skills. The
navy's practice, like that of most European civilian societies,
does not emphasize graduate degree-granting programs, but
rather stresses the attainment of technical skills and
knowledge on a more functional basis. This does not, how-
ever, prevent officers from following courses of instruction
leading to graduate degrees, and in fact, many officers
hold certificates from various universities and institutes
which are equivalent to American graduate degrees.
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Officers are thoroughly schooled in mine
warfare at the Belgian-Netherlands Mine Warfare School.
EGUERMIN has provided training to nearly all officers in
the navy, including naval aviators, as they also receive
tours of duty on non-aviation mine countemeasures vessels
during their careers.
(1) Officer Acquisition and Training . Regular
officer acquisition is primarily from the Royal Military
School which educates officer candidates for all the armed
forces. Some officers enter the navy from four year
civilian Higher Technical Schools and universities, or the
three year Navigation School of the Merchant Marine at
Antwerp. An additional small number of officers is acquired
from the enlisted ranks by what are called "social promo-
1 fifi
tions." Prior to 1967 a small number of officer
applicants were educated in foreign naval academies. This
provided a small cadre of officers well-versed in the




NATO allies. ' Since that time all applicants receive
their basic education in Belgium since it is more cost-
effective. Additionally, the cooperation and technology
sharing between the NATO members has improved sufficiently
to keep all members fully informed through NATO's many
organizations
.
All Royal Military School applicants must
possess a Higher Secondary School certificate which is
equivalent to a United States high school diploma.
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Applicants must be physically and mentally qualified as
measured by medical, psychotechnic and physical tests.
Successful completion of entrance examinations in mathe-
matics, physics, chemistry, history, and geography is re-
quired, as well as a thorough facility with their mother
tongue and an elementary knowledge of the second national
language. Candidates accepted by the Royal Military
School follow a four year program to become line or ser-
vice officers depending upon their program of studies. A
five year program educates technical officers and grants
an engineer's certificate. All sea-going officers serve
a one year "application tour" in the fleet following gradua-
1 88
tion which completes the educational process.
The Officer corps consists of deck officers
(line officers), service officers (supply and administra-
tion), and engineers. The basic career patterns are
similar to those of American naval officers but somewhat
more specialized. The navy does not possess the variety of
ship-types to offer a broad range of opportunities, but
rather concentrates on ASW and MCM missions.
A distinct advantage of the navy's small
line officer community is the increased responsibility
placed on each member. Officers serve many years together
and learn one-another' s strengths and weaknesses. This
greatly enhances the cooperation and working relationships
within the corps . For example, a qualified watch officer is
granted complete control of his ship and maneuvers the
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vessel as necessary while on watch. In comparison, the
United States Navy watch officer must continually call the
commanding officer to request permission to maneuver the
ship, and then normally does so only in the presence of the
commanding officer. This is probably due to the fact that
American commanders seldom serve more than once with any
particular wardroom and then only for a short period of
time. Perforce, the American commander is unable to trust
completely his watch officers, as he never gets to learn
their capabilities fully. The net result is that Belgian
deck officers are better qualified to assume command of a
ship having exercised a full range of responsibility during
their pre-command tours of duty.
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(2) Officer Promotions . The promotion
policy of the Belgian navy is based primarily on experience
levels attained over time. As in other navies, the number
of officers in each grade is set by law, and occasionally
promotions must be delayed until vacancies occur.
The distinctive feature of the Belgian
Navy's promotion policy is the successful completion of an
examination to advance from the Lieutenant Commander to
Commander grade. The examination for promotion to
senior officer consists of tactical and strategic questions
which require answers amounting to a campaign analysis. The
test is rigorous and goes well beyond the scope of the
navy's missions. It is a comprehensive test designed to
evaluate the officer's analytical skills as well as his
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total knowledge of naval ships, weapons, naval warfare and
maturity. Successful completion does not necessarily mean
an automatic promotion; the individual must also be selected.
In many respects the Belgian examination corresponds to the
examination requirement for command at sea in the United
States Navy, although the Belgian examination is also heavy
on theoretical analysis. In the event of unsatisfactory
performance, one retest is permitted. Failure on the re-
test means that the officer will retire as a Lieutenant
Commander.
The current promotion policy requires the
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A recent article in the Belgian Military Maga-
zine, VOX: Mi litair Weekblad , stressed the importance of
schools in "renewing personnel" by providing them with the
knowledge and skills required to man and operate the navy's
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new, highly sophisticated naval vessels. The Belgian
Navy has long recognized that it can no longer operate
without the high degree of training and specilization
acquired only through advanced professional military
training and education. Although the bulk of responsibility
falls upon the petty officer corps, even seaman cannot
escape the impact of modern naval technology as they are
also called on to assist in operating and maintaining their
ship's installed systems. The Belgian Navy must provide
its personnel with the necessary skills to safely man
its fleet and successfully accomplish assigned missions.
This is a difficult task for a small navy due to budgetary
constraints and the extremely limited numbers of personnel
available. As a result, the operator-maintainer principle
is emphasized. Unfortunately, the increased complexity of
naval equipment does not always lend itself to this
principle, especially in the area of electronics. Moreover,
the technical abilities of many personnel are limited making
it necessary to train a few technicians who become the
navy's experts on various pieces of equipment.
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As a result of building a modern fleet with
sophisticated frigates and minehunters, required training
is expensive in monetary terms as well as the length of
time to master required skills. Therefore the navy has
sought cooperation between its allies and industry. For
example, the complexity and variety of equipment in the
new frigates dictated the establishment of 41 different
courses in 1976 alone. These courses are being offered by
the navy's training center, COMIENAV, the Royal Netherlands
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Navy, the French Navy, and industrial manufacturers.
Furthermore, the duration of each course averages 10-12
months. The net result in time and money is the creation
of a cadre of highly skilled technicians of significant
value to the navy.
Belgian petty officers, as in most navies, re-
present the nucleus of highly qualified personnel who
actually make it possible for the navy to operate. Due to
the small number of personnel more responsibility is vested
in the petty officer coprs, particularly to chief petty
officers, than their counterparts in the United States
Navy. They are regularly consulted in areas such as policy
formulation and planning, while sharing a large part of the
execution responsibilities. This is particularly true in
the functional commands and at the fleet level. This re-
flects the fact that the navy has found it not only
convenient but also necessary to provide opportunities of
increased responsibility to those petty officers who meet
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the requisite standards. Moreover, skilled naval personnel
are attractive targets for civilian firms. The navy must
compete in the free-labor market and increased responsibility
has become a successful manpower management tool.
( 1) Enlisted Personnel Acquisition and
Training . All personnel entering an initial enlistment are
provided recruit training that introduces them to military
life. The current length of this training depends on
whether the recruit possesses the qualifications to enter at
the petty officer or seaman level. Generally speaking,
qualified personnel entering at the petty officer level are
career oriented whereas men and women entering as seamen
either do not possess the qualifications for petty officer,
or are conscripts who desire to fulfill their military
obligations without imposing upon themselves additional
obligations required by the various programs open to them.
Petty officer applicants must possess a
completion certificate from Lower Secondary School, which
192is secondary school through age 15- They must also
pass a battery of tests and examinations which include
among other things, technical aptitude, effective knowledge
of their first language, and mathematics. Those candidates
selected receive one year of basic training consisting of
military indoctrination and general military subjects.
This basic instruction is normally followed by up to two
additional years of instruction in the School for Petty
193Officers. J Depending upon the technical specialty
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(rating), the petty officer may be sent to one of Belgium's
naval or armed forces technical schools, or a technical
194
school of a foreign navy. Petty officers often receive
specialized training in weapons systems from the French
195Navy and advanced electronics courses m the Netherlands. J
Men and women entering the naval service
as seamen are not required to possess an educational
certificate. They must, however, pass a series of "selection
tests" to ascertain their effective knowledge of reading,
writing, and other general subjects oriented toward the
ninth grade level of education. The results of these
examinations are used to determine the sailor's aptitude for
a particular rating. Seamen then receive from five weeks
to six months of basic training depending upon their rating.
Conscripts generally receive the minimum instruction
necessary to safely serve in the navy and prepare them for
sea duty should they be so assigned. Since the obligated
active service time has been progressively reduced the navy
cannot afford to provide long, expensive training for sailors
who remain only ten months on active duty. As the same
time the navy must offer sufficient instruction to con-
scripts as they constitute the naval reserve force.
Seamen who desire to make the navy a career
must serve a total of 32 years to receive full retirement
benefits. Furthermore, since the petty officer and seamen
ranks are separate entities, a seaman must pass special
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examinations and complete supplemental instruction to rise
above the rank of petty officer third class.
(2) Enlisted Promotions . The Belgian Navy
enlisted promotion policy is based upon time in rank,
minimum periods of sea duty, and demonstrated performance.
Eligible personnel must receive the recommendation of their
department head and commanding officer to be designated a
candidate for promotion. Actual selection is based upon
performance evaluations and a review of the candidate's
service record. As in the officer corps, a petty officer
may be selected for promotion but have to wait until a
vacancy occurs prior to actually receiving the promotion.
The following experience levels are re-
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2. Women in the Navy
Belgium, like many other nations, has found it
necessary to open its armed forces to women. The politically
motivated revision of the military selective service system
created a large requirement for volunteers. A greater
recruiting effort became necessary in order to keep pace with
the reduction in numbers and length of service of con-
scripts, and to aid in the development of the naval reserve
force. Thus, it was necessary to utilize all sources of
• * 196recruits.
Thirty women were admitted into the navy as seamen
in June 1975 » one year after the army first began recruiting
women. Although women may enter any field of specializa-
tion for which they qualify, they are not allowed assignment
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to combat positions. ' They navy competes with the other
services and the private sector in a free labor market for
the manpower required to fulfill navy requirements. Navy
flexibility to respond to changes in the labor market is
somewhat constrained by government dictated pay scales,
whereas the private sector firms are able to immediately
adjust pay levels upward in response to diminishing man-
power supplies. The military found it easier to attract
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women who have traditionally experienced discrimination in
the private sector when competing with their male counter-
198parts. This has resulted in a significant increase in
the number of women in the navy since 1975. as indicated
in Table IV.
The trend toward an increased number of women in
the navy can be expected to continue as the country's
manpower has been marked by a low natural rate of growth
199(0.2 percent) and progressive aging. Moreover, the new
law concerning military service requirements obliges only
one male per family to perform his military obligation.
Thus, many men are no longer subject to the draft and are
free to commence their careers. Consequently more males
will be available to the free labor market and women will
find it more difficult to compete, as has traditionally
been the case. Therefore it seems logical that more women
must be recruited if the navy is to maintain its current
size
.
Belgian women 18-30 years old are eligible to apply
for naval service as long as they successfully pass the
entrance and medical examinations and are not pregnant.
The initial service obligation is two years and basic train-
ing is the same as their male counterparts with the exception
of modified weapons handling since they will not be assigned
fighting functions.
DAMARS are given priority in assignment to






















SOURCES: "Reunion d' Information Force Navale," Part C:
Personnel, p. l.j "DAMARS: Objectief 1978,"
VOX: Mili tair Weekblad
,
(Vol. 4, No. k,
8 December 1977), pp. 20-21.; Staf Chef van de
Zeemacht Letter dated 12 October 1978, p. 1.
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leave is granted or women may elect to depart the service.
Additionally, a wide latitude of social considerations is
also recognized for which leave may be obtained such as
caring for infant children and similar family responsibilities
DAMARS are still new in the armed forces and it will
undoubtedly be several years before they are fully integrated
into the navy. Similar to women in the United States Navy,
those women who are the early pioneers in a traditionally
all -male organization stand a good chance of making signifi-
cant achievements as new avenues of opportunity are opened
to them. However, it is unlikely that major shore commands
and flag rank are realistic possibilities for a long time
to come due to the small size of the Belgian Navy.
3- Personnel Shortages
The Belgian Navy is continually plagued by a serious
shortage of personnel. The maximum peacetime strength of
the navy is set by Parliament at 70 percent of the wartime
complement. During the past two decades the navy, at
approximately ^,^00 personnel, has averaged five percent
of the total armed forces strength. Paradoxically, the
navy has consistently possessed more ships than it has
been able to man. Admittedly it can be argued that all
the available naval ships are not required to successfully
execute the missions assigned, however, the high operating
tempo of the fleet would indicate otherwise. Additionally,
the number of ships in active service has been reduced to
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provide personnel for the initial break-in period of the
new frigates. Consequently, the fleet is tasked to
201
accomplish the same number of missions with fewer assets.
During the early years of the Cold War the navy
gradually increased from 8 to ^5 minesweepers and escort-
sweepers with the assistance of the United States under the
MDAP and Off-Shore Procurement programs. At that time the
navy averaged ^,800 personnel and found it too difficult to
accomplish all the repairs, training, and mission require-
ments with such a small manning level. Modern techniques
such as combining sweeping and hunting capabilities in a
single mine countermeasures vessel provided the opportunity
to reduce the number of ships without degrading mission
202
capabilities. Unfortunately, the number of authorized
personnel also declined in proportion to an overall reduc-
tion in the armed forces, creating the same conditions
obtained in the mid-fifties. The navy has constantly sought
innovative measures to offset these reductions in personnel.
For example, the rotational-ship system allows a smaller
number of naval personnel and civilians the opportunity
to execute maintenance and repairs more efficiently since
they are free of the normal interruptions of berthing
shifts, inspections, unanticipated operations, and short
turn-around times associated with the operating fleet.
However, if the navy decided that is was necessary to man
all its available ships, approximately 1893 personnel would
203be required based upon published manning information. "*
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The Operations Command presently accounts for about 2,332
personnel (52 percent of the navy) with about 1,570 assigned
to sea duty. C0MP0SNAV would find it difficult to assign
sufficient numbers of personnel to all units and still
maintain its command and planning functions without an
increase in its manpower authorization. Similarly, the
other functional commands would find it equally difficult
to provide personnel to the fleet at the expense of their
mission requirements. Naturally, the requirements to man
all fleet units would be contingent upon the outbreak of
hostilities or some hypothetical national crisis requiring
such a decision. The Naval Reserve consisting of about 5i500
personnel would be available in such a situation to bridge
the gap, but only in the immediate future, as the reserve
forces are dwindling. The Naval Reserve is expected to
further decline due to the large reduction in numbers of
conscripts assigned to the navy. A partial solution to
this problem is the navy's ship acquisition program. The
navy is again taking advantage of the latest state-of-the-
art in naval warfare technology to build a smaller, more
capable fleet which will require fewer personnel. Nonethe-
less, the present situation finds the navy too small to
fully man its units and successfully accomplish all the
planning, coordinating, and support functions required by
the fleet
.
After the initial trials and acceptance periods of
the new frigates the navy will establish a rotation system
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with two frigates in active service, one unmanned in ready
reserve, and one in overhaul. This will free a large
number of personnel to re-man those units which were placed
20^in reserve to provide personnel for the frigate program.
Recent government programs to reduce the burden of
universal military service further complicate the personnel
situation. The new law calls for, (1) a further reduction
of the active duty obligation for conscripts to 11 months
for officers and six months for all others;; (2) requires
that only one member per family must serve in the armed
forces; (3) shortens the total military obligation to
seven years, and; {k) encourages an increase in the number
20S
of women volunteers. J The immediate effects of this program
are a reduction in the number of conscripts assigned to
the navy and a large reduction in the total number of
citizens required to perform military service. The ex-
tremely short active service obligation also increases the
administrative burden caused by rapid turnover of both
active duty conscripts and the reserves. Furthermore, it
is no longer cost-effective to train conscripts beyond the
absolute minimum required to serve safely at sea. The
long-term effect on the navy is a serious reduction of the
Naval Reserve. Additionally, with the professionalization
of the navy, the government plans to further limit the navy's
total authorized strength. To compensate for the loss
of personnel due to the ten month service obligation and
reduction in numbers of conscripts an increase in volunteers
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is authorized. The rationale behind the overall program is
to provide a navy and total operational force with younger
volunteers resulting in a stable quantity and quality of
personnel in the navy.
The burden of increasing the number of volunteers
falls on the Naval Recruiting Program which has been barely
capable of meeting its quotas to keep pace with the number
of volunteers departing the navy. It is also interesting
to note that, due to the more stringent selection criteria
required by a modern, technologically oriented navy, and
especially the requirements for sea duty, approximately ^3
percent of the candidates for the navy fail their medical
examinations. Additionally, the navy has found, like those
of many other nations, that the overall quality of candi-
dates has fallen.
Evidently, the navy hopes to solve its personnel
problems sometime in the mid eighties when all of the new
trinational minehunters are received in the fleet. The
increased capabilities of these ships combined with the
reduced number of personnel required to operate them will
allow the navy to cut the size of the fleet drastically.
Provided the government does not radically reduce authorized
personnel levels, the Belgian Navy should be able to over-
come its personnel problems and continue to make a signifi-
cant contribution to the allied ASW and MCM effort in the




4>. Unionsim in the Belgian Navy
The navy has shared in the general atmosphere of
dissatisfaction in the Belgian armed forces which gave
birth to military unions in the early sixties. Moreover,
any increased benefits or bargaining leverage which accrue
to the union movement in the army would also benefit naval
personnel. Owing to the uniqueness of navy life, and
particularly to the routine of ships at sea, any revision
of the conditions of service which does not take into con-
sideration the particular character of a military service
could have far-reaching consequences for the navy. Thus, the
navy may be approaching the time when a fourty-hour work-
week, overtime for weekend duty, and compensation for night-
time watches may be the norm.
Although military unions are six years old in
Belgium, they have been officially recognized only since
1975. Despite the fact that government legislation is not
complete, unions are growing and will undoubtedly develop
into representative organizations with considerable
negotiating power. How well a navy or the armed forces of
a nation can continue to operate with such organizations is
a question in the minds of many military planners through-
out the free world. The answer to that question is beyond
the purpose and scope of this discussion which will simply




a. The Evolution of Military Unions
Prior to World War One the military profession
in Belgium enjoyed a relatively enviable status. At each
level of the social hierarchy the armed forces occupied a
privileged position. Officers in general belonged to the
nobility or the bourgeoisie; however, they did not form a
social class but rather operated as a caste system. Even
lower ranking professional soldiers were proud of their
status and aware that they belonged to a principal organi-
zation of the state. In general, they were satisfied with
the military service and content in the high esteem pro-
vided them by the citizenry.
During the interwar period a large number of
ex-servicemen who had fought in the 191^-1918 war formed
a large, powerful, and highly organized section of the
electorate. They were respected citizens because of the
years they had spent defending their country at great
personal risk. The nation paid its debt to these men by
the creation of disability pensions and preferential em-
ployment in public service. Veterans occasionally drew up
additional demands for disability benefits and pensions.
Many of these were militantly expressed with public demon-
strations to obtain the support of the population and
eventual passage into law.
The situation after World War Two was quite
the opposite, due largely to the forced surrender of the
army in 19^0. At one fell swoop the armed forces lost the
1^2

prestige they had acquired during their long history dating
back to 1830. The nation was in turmoil due to the charges
and counter-charges of collaboration during the war. The
Belgian Royal Question was but one of the manifestations of
the agony which the nation endured for several years follow-
ing the cessation of hostilities. In essence, Belgium
entered a new age dominated by many new ideas which were
totally contrary to pre-war values. Not only was the military
discredited, even the monarch was verbally assaulted in an
unprecedented fashion and finally forced to abdicate in 1951-
Due to the requirements of the Second World War the influx
of personnel from all sectors of society diluted the domin-
ance of the military by the nobility and bourgeoisie. The
espirit de corps necessary for a united front by the military
no longer existed.
The prevailing public attitudes were reflected in
Parliament's failure to provide the level of benefits,
disability payments, and pensions which the veterans deemed
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appropriate to their sacrifices. Furthermore, the armed
forces were chagrined by the progressive reductions of the
active service obligations of conscripts to 18 and 12
months, respectively, in 195^ and 1956. However, military
discipline was still sufficient to discourage open
211
militancy by its members.
Around i960 these factors coalesced with "a worsen-
ing explosive psychological atmosphere about which the




army 1 ." Newspaper accounts continually ridiculed the
army, especially the officer corps, yet no attempts were
made either "by the Minister of Defense or senior officers
to reply to their critics. Pride and morale in the armed
forces, particularly the officer coprs, were seriously
damaged. Many military men still believed they were "the
elite of the national elite as far as courage, intelligence,
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and a sense of civic responsibility were concerned. *
During this same period of time the Minister of
Defense, A. Gilson, and the President of the Committee of
the General Staff, Lieutenant General Baron Jacques de
Dixmude, disagreed over military reforms initiated by Gilson
The general was distressed by the reductions in military
appropriations and a further proposed reduction in the
length of military service. The Minister of Defense was
further castigated for not replying to the critics of the
army. General de Dixmude made a spectacular gesture by
retiring before reaching the age limit; albeit a gesture
which was generally ignored by a disinterested public
.
Nonetheless, the general's brother, an army colonel, found-
ed the Association des Officiers en Service Actif (AOSA) in
1961. The association was ostensibly a charitable organi-
zation, since disciplinary regulations forbade military men
to join any organization which had political characteristics
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or tendencies. The avowed objective of the AOSA was to
21^
"revalue the army in public opinion."
Since then the AOSA, which began as a basically
idealistic endeavor to regain the army's lost prestige, has
been transformed into a primarily materialistic military
union active in all of the armed forces. However, it must
be noted that the evolution of military unions in Belgium
is far from complete as the Parliament has yet to approve
the legal constitution of the unions. This failure to
approve a constitution for the military unions, three years
after opening union membership to the military, is largely
due to the unresolved questions concerning political affilia-
tion between unions and political parties. Several years
ago one of the unions concluded an agreement with the
Liberal Party. Other parties were fearful of a great in-
crease in the Liberal Party's influence due to this affilia-
tion to a military union. The implications of such affilia-
tions, added to the possibility that inexperienced servicemen
and women could be exploited by extremist parties, is being
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studied prior to voting on the proposed legal constitution.
b. Current Status and Purpose of Military Unions
On Ik January 1975 "the Law Concerning the
Regulation of Discipline in the Armed Forces was promulgated.
This law allows all military personnel, with the exception
of members of the Gendarmerie, to affiliate themselves to
a political party of their choice and grants permission to





As a result of the new law, the men and women
of the armed forces may join one of the two recognized
associations for military personnel, or those trade unions
which are recognized as representing personnel in the civil
service. Although article 30a of "the same law prohibits
strikes by military personnel, the only punishment for
coming out on strike is limited to "solitary confinement,
outside normal working hours, in a secure place," for not
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more than eight days. The most powerful weapon of a
union is the right to strike; one can imagine the
difficulty of enforcement of the no-strike rule should
widespread dissatisfaction occur within the armed forces.
As previously mentioned, material aspects now
dominate the concerns of the unions. Their demands primarily
concern pay and benefits, conditions of service, overtime
remuneration, and the right to be informed concerning
measures contemplated by the government. Included in these
demands is the possibility of negotiations in order to
reconcile any conflicting viewpoints concerning policy
? 1 R
and regulations. The Minister of Defense actively consults
the leaders of the unions on all matters concerning personnel.
Unions may conduct official business with only the Minister
of Defense; official contact with the military hierarchy
pi Q
is prohibited. Total union membership for the armed
forces has steadily increased from about 25 percent in
1972 according to Werner. The military services do not
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maintain statistics on union membership and no estimate
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was offered in response to queries "by this writer.
Aside from the questions concerning political
party-union affiliation and strikes the unions seem to be
working as well as can be expected of any new organizations.
No real tests of power have yet occurred and the Belgian
government and Defense Ministry want to avoid any such
contests of will. Since union membership is still relative-
ly new it is difficult to assess its effects upon the navy.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that social
legislation plays a prominent role in Belgian society.
How well the navy accomplishes its missions in the face
of future union demands will depend to a large degree
upon the leadership in the petty officer and officer corps.
The professionalization of the navy might be the key to
keeping union demands within bounds that allow the navy to
function. Excessive demands could place intolerable con-
straints on the navy's training and operational capabilities
However, as in the Netherlands, West Germany, and a number
of other countries, military unions are becoming a way
of life in Belgium. Only the test of time will prove the
merits of such organizations in the country's armed forces.
D. NAVY FINANCES
The armed forces priority on the national budget re-
mains traditionally low. Immediately following World War
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Two the government cut the size of the army and planned to
maintain the new navy and air force at minimum strenghts.
The reconstruction of the nation and its national economy
was the driving force behind these moves and afforded
scant opportunity to modernize the armed forces.
The nation's commitment to collective security organi-
zations such as the Brussel's Pact in 19^8 and NATO in 19^9
resulted in the obligation to enlarge the military services.
Furthermore, the armed forces had to be equipped with materi'
al comparable to those of its alliance partners in terms
of modernization and in terms of burden- sharing proportion-
221
al to the size of the national economy.
The outbreak of the Korean War provided the second
impetus to enlarge the armed forces and witnessed the
doubling of the defense budget between 19^9 and 1952. The
defense appropriations in 19^-9 were 9-8 percent of the
national budget. They increased to a high of 19-9 percent
in 1952. The priority of the armed forces rapidly declined
with the thaw in the Cold War and its resultant diminished
propsects of confrontation between East and West. Defense
budgets were continually reduced from 1952 through 1976
except for the period 1962-1964 when the need of new
equipment resulted in major expenditures to modernize the
222
armed forces once again.
Since 1976 the defense expenditures of Belgium have
remained stable at 7 • 1 percent of the national budget.
During the past decade defense expenditures averaged
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between 3-0 and 3*5 percent of the nation's gross national
product. Ranked alongside her NATO allies, Belgium con-
sistently holds the tenth or eleventh position for defense
expenditures as a percent of the gross national product.
Nevertheless, since 1967 the defense budget has experienced
an average yearly increase of k-5 percent. The total defense
budget currently averages about $2 billion. J
The armed forces also receive supplemental appropria-
tions, not included in the budget, to execute specific
programs such as the European Defense Improvement Program
(EDIP), the program to return two brigades from West Germany
to Belgium, and the professionalization plan in the armed
22^4-
forces under the latest selective service laws.
1 . The Navy's Operating Budget
The navy receives two annual appropriations de-
signated the Ordinary Budget and the Extraordinary Budget,
plus supplemental appropriations for infrastructure ex-
penses and special programs. The Ordinary or Operating
Budget covers the expenses of personnel and all routine
expenditures associated with operating the fleet. This
budget has averaged about five percent of the defense budget
since 1952. The current Operating Budget averages around
225$100 million annually.
Personnel salaries and wages account for nearly
50 percent of the navy's operating expenses. Military pay
in Belgium, as in most other Western nations, represents
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an ever increasing portion of the navy's budget. In an
effort to stem the rising personnel costs the government
initiated the armed forces professionalization plan to
provide the nation with a smaller more capable military
establishment which would be more cost-effective.
The remainder of the Operating Budget after
personnel expenses is apportioned between the ASW and MCM
missions areas and other defense tasks of the functional
commands. The MCM forces normally receive the largest
share of operating funds, however, that is likely to
change in favor of the frigates since they are more
costly to operate and maintain. Moreover, the MCM forces
have already undergone several modernization and improve-
ment programs during the past several years using Invest-
ment Budget funding.
2. The Navy's Investment Budget
The Extraordinary or Investment Budget is
appropriated primarly for major maintenance, fleet moderni-
zation, construction of new facilities, and ship acquisition
programs. This budget varies from year to year depending
upon the number and scope of authorized programs. During
recent years the budget has been quite large to provide for
the frigate and MCMV construction programs.
The navy, the smallest armed force, has always
received the smallest share of the defense budget and will
undoubtedly continue to do so. Nonetheless, the navy has
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always managed to gain sufficient support for its ship
acquisition programs throughout its history. In the early
fifties the navy received an entire fleet of MCM vessles;
two new mine countermeasures command and support ships in
the mid-sixties; four frigates in the mid-to-late seventies
and; approval for ten minehunters in the eighties. Although
the government seems to maintain the traditional preference
for a small navy, it has nonetheless, provided the navy
with the latest, if not the best, equipment and ships dur-
ing the past 25 years.
The frigate program represents an investment of
$150 million to Belgium and provides the navy with the
means to execute a traditional mission area which it has
not been able to accomplish since the decommissiong of the
Q O ^
Algerine class escort minesweepers in the sixties. Per-
haps equally important to the nation was the stimulation
to the shipbuilding industry in terms of sophisticated
technology and a new capability to build major warships.
The shipbuilding industry also hopes to attract foreign
buyers. Consequently this investment program has more
than purely military benefits to the navy.
Likewise, the new trinational minehunter program
involves an investment of around $50 million which will
benefit both the navy and Belgium's economy. The partici-
pating nations have equitably distributed the manufacture
of various systems between them. Belgian industry is re-
sponsible for the electronic propulsion systems and all
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associated components for the entire class of ships. A
minimum of ^0 vessels is already agreed upon plus options
227
to significantly increase that number.
In general, the navy Investment Budget, although a
fraction of that of the other services, has managed to keep
pace with the navy's mission requirements, even if in a
somewhat belated and constrained fashion compared to the
rest of the armed forces. The frigate program was belated
and constrained and the ASW mission area was neglected
for almost a decade while the navy fought for approval of
the program, and the final design characteristics of the
ships were primarily cost-dictated despite prounouncements
to the contrary.
3. Supplemental Appropriations
The navy also receives an annual stipend to cover
the costs of its infrastructure. Expenditures are made
primarily for modernization and construction at existing
facilities. Construction of new bases comes under the
investment budget after which time maintenance is provided
under these supplemental funds.
The expenses of the navy to provide services and
facilities to NATO forces, such as communications or harbor
facilities also comes under supplemental appropriations.
This is a small budget item and represents only about one
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The preceding chapters have acquainted the reader with
the Belgian Navy by way of a detailed description of the
navy's background, development and current status. At
this point a brief comparison with NATO and the Soviet
Union's naval forces may help to place the Belgian Navy
in perspective.
Several problems become apparent immediately when
comparing the Belgian Navy to those of its allies. The
size and composition of the Belgian fleet are determined
by the missions described in Chapter III. Belgium, as
shown in Table V, maintains the smallest navy in NATO and is
the smallest nation with respect to land area. Furthermore,
a glance at any map of NATO nations indicates that Belgium's
coastline is also the shortest. Although the Netherlands is
most similar to Belgium with regard to land area, popula-
tion, location, and economy, a significant difference be-
tween these two sister nations is the length of their
coastlines, shorelines, and borders. The coastline of the
Netherlands is more than six times that of Belgium, while
the many indentations of the Dutch landmass provide an
even greater shoreline. (See Map 2) Additionally, the
depths of the North Sea are greater in the Netherlands'
coastal area than in Belgium's sector of responsibility. °
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threat, in addition to a mine threat, in a much larger
area of territorial and coastal waters. Deeper waters
permit the use of submarines against the Netherlands' North
Sea lines of communications, "but they also allow the Royal
Netherlands Navy to possess and operate submarines. Belgium,
on the other hand, lies along coastal and approach routes
which are too shallow for modern submarines. Belgian har-
bors are also too shallow, and they are guarded by many
hazardous sandbanks. Therefore, submarine operations
along the Belgian coast, if not impossible, would result in
greater danger and risk to the submarines than to their
intended prey. This all goes to say that the missions of
the Dutch and Belgian Navies are determined by basically
geographic features such as proximity to a particular
threat, length of coastline and shoreline, depth of water,
and so on. Therefore, as indicated in Tables V and VI,
the Royal Netherlands Navy is larger, composed of more
frigate-type vessels to counter the larger threat of sub-
marine warfare, and possesses a small number of submarines.
The larger coastal area, the physical characteristics of
its surrounding waters, and the shape of its landmass have
dictated the need of a larger navy for the Netherlands.
Likewise, the physical features of Belgium's coast and
waters have dictated the size and composition of its navy.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the
size of the armed forces of Belgium and the Netherlands are
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features, and threat expectations. The Belgian Army and
Air Force, like those of the Netherlands, are considerably
larger than the navy because the eastern border of both
countries is the traditional route of invasion. Whether or
not this represents a land war mentality is difficult
to assess. Certainly the historical experiences of these
two nations must have a significant influence upon the
structure and composition of their total armed forces. How-
ever, the composition and minimum strengths of Belgium's
Armed Forces are closely tied to membership in the NATO
alliance and the concept of burden sharing whereby mem-
bers agree to maintain their armed forces at agreed upon
levels. ^ Therefore, if a land war mentality can be said
to exist, it does not do so only in Belgium as evidenced
by the armed forces strengths of all those nations along
the NATO Central Front which has been the traditional
battleground of Europe
.
All factors considered, Belgium does not expect an
attack or invasion from the coast, surrounded as she is
by the navies of France, Britain, the Netherlands, and
West Germany. The threat from the sea for Belgium lies
in the vulnerability of its sea lines of communications either
from coastal mining or submarine operations in the Western
Approaches to the English Channel, the North Sea, and the
Baltic. Thr greatest threat lies not in the crowded Channel
or Southern North Sea, but rather in their outlying approach-
es at a distance from Belgium's coast where hostile
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submarines would be able to interdict the sea lines of
communications. Naturally, the mine threat would be great
within Belgium's immediate coastal area due to the ease and
speed of aerial minelaying techniques. Therefore, Belgium
must possess a navy which can counter the mine threat in
the immediate area of her coast and also help strengthen the
assets of Belgium's allies who guard over the approaches
and chokepoints of the larger North Sea-English Channel area.
It is obvious that the Belgian Navy is too small to
defend itself, let alone Belgium, but today that is also
true of her neighbors. It is apparent from Table VI that
no single nation, not even the United States, possesses
sufficient numbers and capabilities to defend against all
231
possible Soviet threats. J Nonetheless, within the
NATO naval structure the Belgian Navy possesses sufficient
numbers and capabilities to ease the burden of its allies
and to participate as a full partner in the common defense.
Without a navy Belgium would have no voice in the maritime
defense of its coast and waters. With a navy Belgium pro-
vides additional numbers of ships to a NATO naval force
already outnumbered by Soviet naval forces, and it secures
an active role in the vital decision making process
affecting maritime defense
.
A note of caution is warranted. As previously mentioned,
a list of numbers cannot adequately indicate the strength
of a naval force. Inadequate repair, maintenance, overhaul
schedules, and lack of expertise can significantly reduce
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the effectiveness of available ships during any given time
period. The education and training, and cooperation be-
tween naval personnel also plays a major role in success-
ful naval operations. As stressed throughout this paper,
one of the Belgian Navy's most important and valuable con-
tributions to NATO has been its catalytic role in fostering
joint education, training, cooperation, planning and inte-
gration in NATO, all of which springs from the country's
total dedication to collective security as embodied in
the alliance. In this respect, the Belgian Navy could be
called the Belgian NATO Navy. It is totally dedicated,
oriented, and organized to operate as part of the NATO naval
structure. If this were not true, the Belgian Navy could
be reduced in size to accomplish only its national missions.
Such a reduction, although unthinkable, would place the
burden of Belgium's maritime defense upon her allies.
Fortunately, Belgium recognizes that a small, properly
equipped and well trained navy can and does enhance the
overall defense of Western Europe. Moreover, a closer
look at Table VI indicates that most of the navies in NATO
are small. However, the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts. When one subtracts the naval units of the United
States, Canada, France, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Portugal
which are not actually available in the North Sea-English
Channel area, the limited numbers of the Belgian fleet loom
large and become extremely important.
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Who cares about the Belgian Navy? Every nation with an
interest in the maritime defense of Northern Europe should
care. Fortunately, many do, as evidenced by the growing
levels of cooperation, joint construction programs, and
integration of naval units with the Belgians. Every new
addition to the Soviet fleet makes it more difficult for
the Atlantic Alliance to ensure protection of its merchant
fleets. Similarly, every addition to the small navies of
NATO helps to off -set Soviet increases, especially when the
highest levels of Western technology are incorporated into
these vessels.
Although comparisons of the Belgian Navy can be made
with the navies of Norway, Denmark, Portugal, West Germany,
and so on, in each case the variables of location, length
of coastline and shoreline, water depth, and proximity
to a particular threat are the determinants of the size
and composition of each of these navies. If one takes only
the above factors into consideration, the Belgian Navy is,
in relation to them, the largest open ocean navy in the
world. No other navy possesses as many ships as Belgium
relative to the above factors. However, the Belgian Navy
is designed to operate in a larger context than dictated
by its immediate coastal responsibilities. It is designed
to operate as a coastal defense force and in any other
area required by integrated NATO naval commands.
If the Belgian Navy was designed solely as a coastal
defense force, it could be smaller and could concentrate
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only on mine warfare with some type of coastal patrol
craft to provide air and surface protection to the MCM
fleet. This type of single-minded specialization would
provide no ASW or escort capability, and Belgium would
be forced to rely upon its allies for protection of its
merchant fleet and maritime trade. Some military planners
believe that specialization of this type could help the
smaller NATO countries maintain a meaningful defense
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effort with limited resources. J Specialization could,
however, become a rationale for doing less while leaving
large gaps in the overall defense of Western Europe. It
would almost certainly result in a further reduction in
fleet sizes and capabilities. As previously mentioned,
the Belgian Navy is traditionally known for its mine warfare
expertise. The recent addition of ASW-escort frigates was
looked upon in some quarters as a shift away from speciali-
zation which might lead to a degradation of the MCM
capability. As this paper has attempted to show, nothing
could be further from the truth. The Belgian frigates
actually strengthen the MCM capability by providing pro-
tection to the MCM fleet while restoring the navy's ability
to help protect its merchant fleet from surface and sub-
surface threats. Anti-submarine warfare and convoy escort-
ing are not new missions for the Belgian Navy, but long-
standing missions which were never adequately accomplished
in the past. The renewed, if limited, capability provided
by the frigates augments the assets of Belgium's allies
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and must be looked upon as a significant contribution to
the common defense.- Any fears that Belgium might diminish
her MCM specialization should be dispelled by the navy's
enthusiasm and cooperation in the Trinational Minehunter
Program.
Belgium's extremely heavy reliance on maritime trade,
its location abreast the world's most heavily travelled
sea routes, its participation in many international organi-
zations and treaty obligations, dictate the need for a
capable navy to execute its responsibilities as a coastal
nation. Anything less than a small war-fighting navy would
diminish Belgium's role in decision-making forums which are
vital to her national interests. Throughout her history,
Belgium has been a small economic power of considerable
"""""7
importance > One can only guess what might have been, had
Leopold I obtained a strong navy during Belgium's formative
years. Seapower is no less important today but fortunately,
Belgium recognizes that fact as indicated in the remarks of
the Minister of Defense in 196? when he said, "when the
nation is a strongbox then the merchant marine and the
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navy are the keyhole and key." JJ
Today Belgium possesses a small, yet strong key for
its door. That key is the Zeemacht-Force Navale . It
deserves greater recognition and acknowledgement from all










Displac ement 2,34-0 Tons
Length 106.4- Meters
Beam 12.3 Meters
Draft i 5.S Meters
Speed 28 Knots






Sonar SQS 505a (Canadian)
Bofors Rocket Launcher - 375
2 Torpedo Launchers L5
1 Sea-Sparrow Launcher
4- Exocet Missiles
1 lOOmm Multipurpose Gun
MINE COUNTERMEASURES FLOTILLA 22




















Zinnia: 3 - 40MM gun
mounts
.
Built in Belgium 1965-1967-
SOURCES: "Operationele Richtlijnen Voor 1977," Krijgsmacht,
Generale Staf , Staf van de Zeemacht, Sec tie Operaties, 1977,
pp. 1-1 - 1-2. "Familieportret, " VOX: Militair Weekblad ,
(Vol. 3, No. 33, 23 September 1976), pp. 15-19- P.P. Vande
Sande, "Familieportret," VOX: Militair Weekblad
,
(Vol. 2,
No. 18, 15 May 1975), PP- 7-10. "The Means Available to






Ocean Minesweeper Squadron 191 - MSO/MHSO
800M-902 Van Haverbeke Displac ement
:
Tons
M-903 Dufour Length 52.7 Meters
M-904 DeBrouwer Beam 10.7 Meters




M-908 Truffaut Crew ; 5 Officers
M-909 Bovesse 67 Enlisted
Built in the USA between 1955
and I960.
Capabilities
All units except M-907 will have the SQQ 14 variable
depth sonar and 2 PAPs by 1980. All units will retain
the mechanical mine sweeping capability.
Weapons
All units except M-903 are equipped with 1 - 40MM single
mount gun. Minesweepers and minehunters are not designed
with self-protection in mind, but rather a weapon which
can be used to destroy swept moored mines.
































MHC - 4 Officers
34 Enlisted
Built in Belgium 1953-1955
except M-934 and M-935 which






Inshore Minesweeper Squadron 219 - MSI
M-47^ Turnhout Displac ement: 190 Tons
M-^75 Tongeren Length : 3^.5 Meters
M-^76 Merksen Beam : 6.7 Meters
M-^-77 Oudenaarde Draft : 2.1 Meters







Crew : 1 Officer
16 Enlisted




2-50 caliber Machine Guns
acoustic, or
The following fleet units are under the direct operational
command of COMOPSNAV and are administratively assigned to
various shore Naval Commands:













Duties: Ready Duty Ships (RDS),
Research and Surveys.



























Built in West Germany 1953-195^












28 meter Bermuda Ketch used for
sail training and ocean research
Crew: 2 officers, 7 enlisted
Former MSC converted to hydro-
graphic research vessel.




Former MSC being converted into
a degaussing control vessel.
7 auxilliary harbor and yard craft assigned to the various
Naval Commands.
The New Trinational Minehunter


















20 mm gun mounts
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